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# SCALE AND SUSTAINABILITY STUDY: THE AKAZI KANOZE YOUTH EDUCATION AND LIVELIHOODS PROJECT IN RWANDA

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## **DISCLAIMER**

The authors' views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Agency for International Development or the United States Government.



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## ACRONYMS

ABE	Accelerated Basic Education
AERG	Association des Etudiants Et Éléves Rescapés Du Genocide (association of student survivors of genocide)
AK	Akazi Kanoze is the model that has been developed and implemented
AKO	Akazi Kanoze Organization (future)
AKP	Akazi Kanoze Project
AKNM	Akazi Kanoze Network Member (future)
AKMU	Akazi Kanoze Management Unit (current and future)
AKUC	Akazi Kanoze Urban Classic Model
AKRC	Akazi Kanoze Rural Classic Model
AKSLG	Akazi Kanoze SLG Model
ALP	Accelerated Learning Program
AVSI	Association of Volunteers in International Service
BDC	Business Development Center
BDSS	Business Design Supplying and Services, Ltd.
BTC	Belgian Development Agency
BTC-CTB	Centre for Support to Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises in Rwanda
COP	Chief of Party
CPJSP	Centre de Promotion de Jeunes Pour Sortir de la Pauvreté
CRS	Catholic Relief Services
CSO	Civil Society Organization
CYM	Community Youth Mapping
DCOP	Deputy Chief of Party
DG	Director General
EA	Esther's Aid
EDC	Education Development Center, Inc.
EO	Economic Opportunity <sup>1</sup>
EOI	Expressions of Interest
EDPRS	Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
GNI	Gross National Income
GOR	Government of Rwanda
ICT	Information and Communication Technology
IF	Imbutu Foundation
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
IGA	Income Generating Activity
IPs	Implementing Partners
IPRCs	Integrated Polytechnic Regional Centres
kLab	Knowledge Lab is an open technology hub.
LOP	Length of Program
MFI	Microfinance Institution
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MICOF	Mibirizi Coffee And Food Stuffs Ltd.
MIFOTRA	Ministry of Public Service and Labor
MINAGRI	Ministry of Agriculture and Animal Resources
MINECOFIN	Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning

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1. For the purposes of this evaluation, an economic opportunity is defined as part-time or full-time employment, paid internships, income generating cooperatives, micro-enterprises, self-employment, and other means of earning a livelihood.



MINEDUC	Ministry Of Education
MINICOM	Ministry of Trade and Industry (Commerce)
MINISANTE	Ministry Of Health
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MSMEs	Micro, Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises
MYICT	Ministry of Youth and Information and Communication Technology, Rwanda
NGO	Nongovernmental Organization
NQF	National Qualifications Framework
NYC	National Youth Council
OVC	Orphans and Vulnerable Children
PAJER	Parlement de Jeune Rwandais (Rwanda Youth Parliament)
PIU	Project Implementation Unit
PPPMER	Projet pour la promotion des petites et micro-entreprises rurales
PS	Permanent Secretary
PSF	Private Sector Federation
RDB	Rwanda Development Board
RGAC	Rwandan Governmental Advisory Council
RFA	Request for Applications
RTQF	Rwanda TVET Qualification Framework
RURA	Rwanda Utilities Regulatory Agency
RYON	Rwanda Youth Opportunity Network
RYP	Rwanda Youth Program
S3	Third (and last) year of lower secondary school
S6	Third (and last) year of upper secondary school
SACCOs	Savings and Credit Cooperative Organizations
SILCs	Savings and Internal Lending Communities
SE	Social Enterprise
SLG	Savings and Lending Group
SME	Small and Medium-Sized Enterprise
SMS	Short Message System
SOW	Statement of Work
TSS	Technical Secondary Schools
TT	Technical Training
TVET	Technical and Vocational Education and Training
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USG	United States Government
VSLA	Village Savings and Loan Associations
VTC	Vocational Training Center
WDA	Workforce Development Authority, Rwanda
WRC	Work Readiness Curriculum
YEGO	Youth Empowerment for Global Opportunities

# I. INTRODUCTION

## A. PURPOSE OF THE STUDY

United States Agency for International Development’s (USAID) 2012 Policy on Youth in Development lays out the Agency’s focus on youth as an important population and commits it to provide high quality youth programming (USAID, 2012). USAID’s Evaluation Policy is a key part of Agency efforts to ensure that programs are based on strong evidence, which includes incorporating strong monitoring and evaluation techniques into program design (USAID, 2011b). In light of these policies, USAID’s Office of Education commissioned a study of the scale and sustainability of the USAID-funded Akazi Kanoze (AK) youth livelihoods program in Rwanda. In addition, this study falls within the purview of Goal 2 of the Education Strategy, “improved ability of tertiary and workforce development programs to produce a workforce with relevant skills to support country development goals by 2015” (USAID, 2011a). The purpose of the research is to accumulate lessons learned that can be used to improve the prospects of scale and sustainability for other similar USAID-funded youth workforce development programs.

Akazi Kanoze is a four-year, US\$9.8 million project funded by USAID under the EQUIP3 leader with associates award that serves youth ages 14–35 with the objectives of: (1) increasing their capability of earning a livelihood through connecting them to appropriate life and work readiness training, and (2) building the capacity of local institutions (government, private sector, and civil society) “to better prepare youth for work, and connect them to personal development, employment and self-employment opportunities” (EDC, 2011a).

The study was designed to answer the following questions:<sup>2</sup>

1. What scaling up of AK that has occurred to date?
2. What is the potential for the future scaling up and sustainability of AK?
3. What can be put in place to ensure future scaling up and sustainability of the program?
4. What are the lessons learned in AK that might assist in improving the scaling up and sustainability of other USAID-funded youth workforce development projects?

## B. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE STUDY

The analytical framework for this study was informed by “Scaling Up: A Framework and Lessons for Development Effectiveness from Literature and Practice” by Hartmann and Linn of the Brookings Institution. The definition of scale guiding the study is that coined by Hartmann and Linn (2008)-- “expanding, adapting and **sustaining** successful policies, programs or projects in different places and over time to reach a greater number of people.” The inclusion of both scale and sustainability in this definition is critical for fulfilling this study’s learning objectives. Through a meta-analysis of successfully scaled programs, Hartmann and Linn identify the following domains as critical for scale and sustainability:

- Applying leadership, vision, and values;
- Managing political constituencies;
- Ensuring supportive policies;
- Developing institutional capacity;
- Creating incentives and accountability;
- Practicing evaluation, learning, and feedback; and
- Planning for success

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2. The study was not intended to be a project design or an evaluation.

These domains, along with information garnered from two other reports on scaling up and sustainability (Cooley and Kohl, 2005; World Health Organization, 2009) and consultations with USAID, were used by the study team to develop the analytical framework, which is made up of topics of interest, and key points of inquiry (See Table 1.).

**Table 1: Analytical Framework**

Topics of Interest	Key Points of Inquiry
Scale and Sustainability Experience	Scale and level of sustainability achieved to date; Preparation in place for scaling and sustainability
Enabling Environment	Supportive policies; Social, cultural, economic environment; Enablers and potential obstacles for scale and sustainability
Leadership Drivers and Political Constituencies	Leadership in place; Leadership strategy; Current and future program stakeholders; Stakeholder interests and concerns
Partnerships and Capacity Building	Partner institutional capacity; Partner capacity for taking leadership in scale up and sustainability
Mechanisms for Coordination	Structures in place for coordination of implementers and partners
Level of Program Implementation	Key components of the intervention; Key components of the implementation strategy; Changes in implementation over time
Program Demand	Perceived and real demand for program by stakeholders
Measuring Evidence of Program Success	Monitoring and evaluation (M&E) systems; Learning and feedback systems; Documented success of the program

### C. STUDY METHODOLOGY

This study utilized a mixed-method approach that included document review, key informant interviews, focus group discussions, and quantitative data analysis.

In collaboration with USAID/Rwanda, the authors identified stakeholder groups to be included in the study to ensure adequate coverage of the framework components and various stakeholder perspectives. Data was collected from the following groups<sup>3</sup> (sample sizes indicated below):

- USAID/Rwanda management and staff (3)
- EDC/Rwanda management and staff (8)
- Local implementing partner staff (36)
- Donors working in Rwanda (5)
- Rwandan Government officials (13)
- Graduates and current AK students (200+)
- Employers who provide internships or employment to AK graduates (5)
- Other consultants and development professionals working in Rwanda (10)

The key points of inquiry identified in the analytical framework were used as the basis for key informant interview protocols. For each category of informant, the team generated an interview protocol (See Annex 1.). The study team used a triangulation process to increase the validity of the study. This process included comparing multiple data sources to identify areas of convergence and divergence, as well as assessing similarities and differences in the findings and conclusions of each investigator.

3. With the exception of graduates and current AK students, please see Appendix 1 for a full listing of the individuals and groups engaged in the field study.

## D. ORGANIZATION OF THE REPORT

Following the introduction, Section II provides a brief summary of the context in which AK was implemented, including the economic and policy environment, the education and training context, and the donor environment. Section III outlines the AK model components and implementation approach. An analysis of the foundation for sustainability and scaling up of AK that was in place by February 2013 follows in Section IV. Section V outlines three potential scenarios for sustaining and scaling AK in the future. Finally, Section VI offers key observations and recommendations that are relevant to the sustainability and scaling of other USAID-funded youth workforce development programs.

## II. CONTEXT

This section discusses the economic, policy, education and training, and donor assistance context in which AK operates, with a focus on areas relevant to youth education, workforce development, and livelihoods.

### A. ECONOMIC AND POLICY ENVIRONMENT

Rwanda has a population of more than 10.8 million, with the number of inhabitants expected to reach 16 million by 2020 in part due to the high fertility rate of 4.7 children per woman (MINECOFIN, 2000; NISR, 2013a; CIA, 2013). This rapid population growth is causing a “youth bulge” in Rwanda, which is projected to increase (See Annex 3 for more information).<sup>4</sup> According to the Third Integrated Household Living Conditions Survey (EICV3), 72 percent of the population is 25 years of age or younger (NISR, 2013a), and 61.5 percent of Rwanda’s working age population is 16–35, with 125,000 new people entering the labor market each year (MIFOTRA, 2013a).

These young people are growing up in a rapidly changing Rwanda. The country’s economy has improved profoundly in a short period of time, yet it still has high poverty rates, large numbers of people living in unplanned communities, and a large rural population that relies on subsistence farming. The Government of Rwanda (GOR) has laid out its strategy to overcome these challenges. Vision 2020 is the GOR’s primary economic and growth policy and drives much of the government and international donor community’s investment priorities. The overarching ambition set forth in Vision 2020 is for Rwanda to grow into a middle income country by 2020 (MINECOFIN, 2000). Vision 2020 is operationalized by various national plans, of which the Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategies (EDPRSs) are of chief importance. The EDPRS 2, currently in draft form, heavily emphasizes rural development and youth employment, particularly through vocational training. Key policy documents, including the National Youth Policy and EDPRS 2, explicitly identify youth as critical drivers of economic development and poverty reduction.

In 2011, Rwanda’s gross national income (GNI) per capita based on purchasing power parity in current international dollars, was \$1,270, ranking it 193<sup>rd</sup> out of 214 countries (World Bank, 2013). Although 44.9 percent of the Rwandan population is estimated to live in poverty, the poverty rate dropped more than 12 percent between 2005/6 and 2010/11. Data from 2011 show that while overall employment is high in Rwanda at 86 percent, the employment rate for people aged 15-24 is quite a bit lower at 73 percent (World Bank, 2013).<sup>5</sup> Men and women have roughly the same unemployment rates, but data suggest that Rwandans aged 16-24 have twice the level of unemployment as those that are 35-44 (Malunda & Musana, 2012).

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<sup>4</sup> While the United Nations as young people between the ages of 15 and 24 as youth, in Rwanda youth are defined as population aged 14-35. This largely overlaps with the demographic target for AK.

<sup>5</sup> Note that the rate of employment for this age group fell between 2005/2006 and 2010/2011 from 77 percent to 64 percent, which probably reflects the increase in school enrollment (Malunda & Musana, 2012).

Most Rwandans work more than one job, especially in rural areas, with 42 percent of workers reporting two jobs and 21 percent of workers reporting three jobs. Most Rwandans work in private informal jobs. According to the EDPRS 2, only four percent of the Rwanda's total labor force works in the private formal sector (MINECOFIN, 2013). For people over age 16 who normally work in wage or salaried jobs, nine percent work in the public sector, three percent in a parastatal organization,<sup>6</sup> 16 percent in private formal positions, and 70 percent in private informal positions (NISR, 2013b).<sup>7</sup>

A shift from unplanned communities (Umudugudu) to planned settlements has been occurring, with 39 percent of households currently living in planned communities as compared to 18 percent in 2005/06. More than 85 percent of the population lives in rural areas and over 70 percent of Rwandan's report agriculture as their main job (MINECOFIN, 2013), yet agriculture only accounts for about one-third of gross domestic product (GDP) (OECD, 2012). These statistics paint a picture of low-production, subsistence farming. The Strategic Plan for the Transformation of Agriculture in Rwanda, Phase III (PSTA III) states that the long-term "goal is to move Rwandan agriculture from a largely subsistence sector to a more knowledge-intensive, market-oriented sector, sustaining growth and adding value to products" (MINAGRI, 2013). While agriculture is still a large part of Rwanda's economic strategy moving forward, the Government of Rwanda (GOR) is making the service sector—which accounted for 53 percent of GDP growth between 2008 and 2011—a priority (MINECOFIN, 2013).

Entrepreneurship is also a high priority for the GOR, which is encouraging youth to be job creators instead of job seekers (MINECOFIN, 2013). Therefore, the GOR is creating an environment to enable youth to become entrepreneurs by using a range of mechanisms to provide training opportunities, support for small businesses and cooperatives, and access to financing, including training at business development centers (BDCs) and financing through Savings and Credit Cooperatives (SACCOs) (MINECOFIN, 2013). While many Rwandans are not involved in the formal banking system, the numbers are improving—the share of individuals having savings accounts rose from 9.2 percent in 2005/2006 to 20.6 percent in 2010/2011. Household access to credit rose from 57.8 percent to 73.7 percent during that same time period.

The economic situation in the country is improving, yet Rwandan youth are still faced with immense challenges. It is a difficult environment in which to provide youth workforce development services—especially when targeting the most disadvantaged youth. Program implementers are generally not able to charge for services, and in fact, are more likely to have to pay for transportation and food so students can attend. Serving rural youth present the greatest challenge—dispersed populations, inadequate infrastructure, the necessity of working on family farms, higher levels of poverty, and lack of education act as barriers to programming. Regarding the lack of education, oftentimes programs must incorporate more rigorous basic education (literacy and numeracy) components in order to prepare youth for work outside of subsistence farming.

## **B. EDUCATION AND TRAINING ENVIRONMENT**

The GOR has taken action to reduce poverty by improving education. The current GOR education policy includes nine years of tuition-free compulsory education (Paxton, 2012). Students who complete nine years are entitled to pursue further study in general secondary school, teacher training colleges, and technical and vocational education and training (TVET), but it is not compulsory. The GOR has made major strides in recent years in strengthening the basic education system. Primary school completion has improved dramatically in the last five years,<sup>8</sup> and secondary school participation rates are

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6. USAID's Automated Directive System defines a parastatal as "Government-funded or-owned organizations that are often otherwise independent of government and whose debt obligations are generally not backed by the full faith and credit of the sovereign government" (USAID, n.d.).

7. Note that this does not encompass the entire workforce.

8. From 2007 to 2011, the primary completion rate increased from 52 percent to 78.6 percent (MINEDUC, 2012).

improving, although they are still quite low<sup>9</sup> (MINEDUC, 2012; NISR, 2013a). The education sector in Rwanda is guided by the Education Sector Strategy Plan (ESSP) 2010-2015 which lays out the GOR's aims to improve education in the country through increasing the quality and coverage of the basic nine year education, as well as putting resources into post-basic<sup>10</sup> education, which includes TVET programs, secondary schools, and higher education. Teacher education is also prioritized as a part of this vision. The goal of the ESSP is to have an education system that is equitable, accessible, and more responsive to labor market needs (MINEDUC, 2010).

The huge number of youth who will be striving to enter the labor force has caused GOR to recognize the need for stronger vocational education and other labor market institutions. Students can enter the TVET system at Vocational Training Centers (VTCs) following primary schooling, or after their ninth year of education at Technical Secondary Schools (TSSs) (NISR, 2012). See Annex 7 for Rwanda's GOR TVET qualification framework. The Workforce Development Authority's (WDA's) system of Integrated Regional Polytechnic Centers (IPRCs), which provide skills programs at different levels in a track parallel to general education in (Paxton, 2012), is currently accessed by only a small fraction of the population, and its training requires better alignment with the needs of a modern economy (MIFOTRA, 2012; MINECOFIN 2013). The WDA is currently undergoing a complete restructuring of the TVET system, which addresses many of its weaknesses, such as lack of consistent funding, focus on select geographical areas, lack of attention to practical application, and lack of training capacity (MIFOTRA, 2012).<sup>11</sup> The most important aspects of this TVET reform are: the launch of the Rwanda TVET Qualification Framework (RTQF) to standardize TVET education; the development of market-relevant, competency-based curricula; and the creation of a TVET structure in which an Integrated Polytechnic Regional Center (IPRC) manages the TVET system in each province (WDA plans to absorb TSSs and VTCs) (MIFOTRA, 2012; WDA, 2012).<sup>12</sup> It is anticipated that students will be able to exercise greater flexibility and control over career planning and continuous learning. The reforms are also important to the implementation and sustainability of new curricula in the TVET system as the IPRCs will potentially be responsible for managing the implementation of new curricula and training trainers. This structure will allow a standardized approach to implementation and support for trainers, teachers, and students.

TVET schools are attempting to close the skills gap that affects the labor market; however, these institutions vary in quality, have inadequate coverage, and are not yet well aligned with private sector needs (MIFOTRA, 2012; MINECOFIN, 2013). The skills gap is a critical labor market issue--the National Skills Audit found that "though there is an across the board shortage of skills in all the skill categories (managers, professionals, technicians, and artisans), the deficit is deepest in the technician cadre where the gap is reported at 60 percent of the requirement"<sup>13</sup> (MIFOTRA, 2009). There is evidence that the problem has worsened: "the number of firms reporting inadequate skills as a major constraint has doubled since 2006" (MINECOFIN, 2013).

The skills gap is compounded by the negative attitudes toward work shown by many youth, especially educated youth who refuse jobs they perceive to be "blue collar" (MINECOFIN, 2013). Employer surveys indicate that they place a high value on "generic/employability competencies" or soft skills such as managing conflicts, time management, and customer service (PSF, 2011). However, few opportunities exist for young people to develop those skills. The situation is improving, but labor markets and economic institutions are mostly in the early stages of development.

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9. Twenty-one percent of youth ages 13–18 are enrolled in secondary school, up from 10 percent in 2005/2006 (NISR, 2013a).

10. Basic education includes primary and lower secondary levels.

11. The Human Capital and Skills Strategy list eight historical weaknesses of the TVET system (MIFOTRA, 2012, pg. 74)

12. WDA and the Belgian Common TVET Support Programme (BCP/ PAFP) have succeeded in aligning sixteen experimental competency-based curricula with RTQF (WDA, 2013).

13. A report on skills gaps by the Private Sector Federation (PSF) illustrates the skills mismatch. For example, employers in the construction sector expressed a need for workers who were competent in residential construction, and ICT employers lacked capable database managers (PSF, 2010).

While Rwanda has numerous private training centers owned by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and a functioning public TVET system, there are only the beginnings of a “coherent labour market information system,” and plans to develop a “guiding strategic framework for private sector capacity building” (MIFOTRA, 2012). There is also a lack of institutions that provide career planning, placement, or job search assistance is another challenge. The government is making serious investments in education and training programs with goal of creating a workforce that fulfills labor market demand in the coming years; therefore, innovative, flexible, and market-relevant youth workforce development programs that show proven impact have great potential to thrive.

### C. DONOR ENVIRONMENT

Rwanda is heavily dependent on foreign financial support, which now accounts for over 40 percent of the national budget (Clover, 2013). Many donors are strongly aligned with the GOR’s focus on vocational training and provide major support to the TVET system and the WDA. Recently, large donors reduced or redirected their general budget support to the GOR as a result of concerns related to Rwandan involvement in the conflict in Democratic Republic of Congo. For example, Germany released its funds under the proviso that they be used for economic development and vocational training. Recently, the African Development Bank (AfDB) agreed to provide financing in support of the Skills Employability and Entrepreneurship Programme (SEEP) (MINECOFIN, 2013a).<sup>14</sup> Donors, however, have expressed an interest in increasing funding for initiatives that come about as a result of authentic labor market demand.

Donor coordination in education occurs both among donors through an ‘education donor coordination group,’ and between donors and the government. The latter collaborative entities are called clusters, also known as ‘joint government-donors sector working groups’ and are designed ensure coordination at the sector level.<sup>15</sup> The education sector working groups has sub-sector working groups, including ones for TVET and girls education.

In terms of support of the WDA and the TVET system, various donors are providing specific support to different regions or parts of the system. For example, Belgium focuses its mostly in the Southern province and has been instrumental in rehabilitating and renovating, and SWISSAID focuses on the West. According to several interviewees, donor efforts to support the WDA and TVET system often lack coordination and programs can be duplicative. Both the World Bank and GIZ have separately provided funding for skills development. However, many TVET providers have not received any support for rehabilitation and have poor infrastructure and equipment.

In summarizing coordination between donors and donors and the GOR, a draft report on the TVET system concluded:

*The main characteristics of current TVET public, private and development partner expenditure is that it is less well coordinated, based on ‘islands’ of interventions and that it is difficult to obtain an overview of the current financial support to the sector. National public and development partner funds do not appear well coordinated to support a national TVET sector reform implementation plan. –PEM Consult, 2009, p. 25*

According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) there are several fairly large donors active in Rwanda (OECD, 2013) (See Table 2.).

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14. For example, AfDB provided USD \$39.95 million in sector budget support.

15. See DFID “Sector Budget Support in Practice –Case Study Education Sector in Rwanda.” London: Overseas Development Institute and Oxford, UK: Mokoro. Nov. 2009. There are nine active clusters; one is education.

**Table 2: Donors in Rwanda**

Donor	Overseas Development Assistance Disbursements (USD millions, constant 2011 prices) 2012 <sup>16</sup>
United States	150.11
Global Fund	150.19
International Development Association (World Bank)	100.16
EU Institutions	95.64
United Kingdom	59.65
AfDB	50.76
Belgium	46.33
Netherlands	39.03
Japan	31.03
Germany	25.83

Source: OECD DAC Country Programmable AID page

A few of the more active TVET donors are:

- *African Development Bank (AfDB)* and GOR signed a USD 39.5 financing agreement in April 2013 to support the Skills Employability and Entrepreneurship Programme (SEEP). This support is aimed at increasing: the percentage of TVET enrollment in upper secondary school, the percentage of TVET students in engineering and ICT tracks, and the percentage of self-employment in off-farm-jobs (MINECOFIN, 2013a).
- *German Society for International Cooperation (GIZ)* implements a variety of workforce development programming in Rwanda, including the Upgrade Your Skills Initiative, which provides short-term vocational training, materials (e.g., start-up kits), and logistical support to public and private companies, cooperatives, training providers, and associations willing to upgrade their employees' skills and other interested outsiders. Applicants must have prior knowledge of the vocation and are expected to provide some contribution towards the cost of the training (GIZ, n.d.).
- *Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA)* has helped build capacity at the Tumba College of Technology (TCT), provided skills training to disabled people through the Technical Cooperation Project, and helped TVET schools develop stronger links with industry (including developing industrial attachment programs in some schools) (JICA, 2013).
- *Korean International Cooperation Agency (KOICA)* has provided capacity building assistance to Kicukiro Technical Training Centre (KTTC) in construction, electrical, industrial installation, automobile, and information technology. KOICA also signed a USD 5.6 Million in April 2013 to create an ICT innovation center at the IPRC in Kicukiro, Kigali (The Rwanda Focus, 2013).
- *Belgian Development Cooperation (BTC) / Programme d'Appui à la Formation Professionnelle (PAFP)*, a group of Belgian development organizations that conduct action research at nine TVET schools in the Southern Province that is part of a qualitative improvement process focused on the technical areas of construction, hospitality, agri-business, veterinary and forestry. PAFP also builds capacity at WDA institutions and supported the development of the Integrated Polytechnic Regional Centre (IPRC) in the Southern Province (BTC, n.d.). The PAFP is also

<sup>16</sup>. These amounts are an average for 2010-2011.



collaborating with the WDA as they develop and implement the new TVET curricula; this includes aligning new TVET curricula with the RTQF (WDA, 2013).

- Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC), in partnership with Swiss Contact, is building four to five TVET schools in Western districts where there are none currently. They will train teachers and administrators, and aim to adapt curricula to disadvantaged youth with less education (key informant interview, January 2013).
- The World Bank (WB) is implementing new curricula and providing support to seven TVET schools, conducting strengthening activities for the TVET system as a whole (e.g., informing strategic policy decisions), and facilitating rapid skills delivery through provision of grants to all types of training providers (private, public, associations, cooperatives, etc.) (World Bank, 2011). The WB has provided \$6 million USD for this Skills Development Fund, which is managed by the WDA (Gaga & Musosbo, 2012).
- Netherlands Cooperation provides funding to several TVET initiatives through its Embassy in Rwanda. They have given five million Euros to GIZ, five million Euros to the WDA. The Dutch Ministry of Cooperation, in 2009, also gave 4.2 million Euros to the Private Sector Federation with the aim of making TVET education more responsive to the needs of the labor market. (Gaga & Musobo, 2012).

### III. THE AKAZI KANOZE PROGRAM: STRUCTURE, COMPONENTS, AND MODELS

#### A. DESCRIPTION

Akazi Kanoze (AK) is a five-year (October 2009- January 2014) , \$9.8 million project funded by USAID under the EQUIP3 Leader with Associates award.<sup>17</sup>

The program seeks to improve the livelihood options of youth ages 15–24 in urban communities and 15–35 in rural communities.<sup>18</sup> The project’s specific objectives are to: (1) Enable youth to be more capable of earning a livelihood, through appropriate and relevant connections to life and work readiness training; and (2) Enable local institutions (government, private sector, and civil society) “to better prepare youth for work, and better connect them to personal development, employment and self-employment opportunities” (EDC, 2010). To accomplish these objectives, AK developed multiple program components that are delivered in various ways depending on the capabilities and expertise of local implementers, target population needs, location, and desired outcomes.<sup>19</sup>

#### SUMMARY OF AKAZI KANOZE RESULTS as of March, 2013

- **13,733 (6842M, 6891F)** Youth have participated in the Work Readiness Training;
- **5,911** Youth have pursued further education or training after Work Readiness Training;
- **4,421** Youth have gained jobs or involved in income generating activities;
- **3,241** Orphans and vulnerable children have been provided with education and/or vocational training;
- **2,908** OVCs have received economic strengthening services;

Excerpt from Akazi Kanoze website.

Contrary to the traditional pedagogical methods used in most formal and vocational training schools in Rwanda, AK’s curricula employ a learner-centered, participatory approach. Trainers are referred to as facilitators and are often very close in age to participants. They structure classes so students can share ideas, work with their peers on group projects, role play, and participate in various games and activities (e.g., group discussions and interactive presentations). Students are free to explore and engage in hands-on activities in this dynamic environment. The desired outcome is youth who have a strong sense of self, clear goals, and marketable skills that go beyond technical vocational training.

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<sup>17</sup> Since the assessment was conducted, the project went through two modifications, extending the project performance period to June 2016 with a total estimated cost of approximately \$12.5 million.

<sup>18</sup> Rural activities started in 2012.

<sup>19</sup> The study team and the project implementing partner developed a set of shorthand titles for the various implementation approaches for the AK model (e.g., AK Urban Classic).

## B. PROGRAM COMPONENTS

The centerpiece of AK is the Work Readiness Curriculum (WRC), which teaches youth a variety of soft skills, such as customer service, positive work habits, and communication abilities that can help them become more effective employees and entrepreneurs.

**Table 3: WRC Curriculum Modules**

Modules	Description
Personal Development	Identifying values and interests; assessing attributes and skills; identifying learning styles and learning strategies; goal setting, planning and tracking progress
Interpersonal Communication	Speaking and listening; following and giving instructions and feedback; forms of communication in the workplace; cooperating/working as a team member; providing good customer service
Work Habits and Conduct	Identifying and applying for jobs (writing applications, CVs, cover letters, thank you letters); interviewing; workplace behaviors and attitudes; time management; balancing work and home life
Leadership	Characteristics of an effective leader; leadership styles; organizing and motivating others; team building; leading others in problem solving and conflict resolution
Safety and Health at Work	Rwanda health and safety laws and practices; identifying and avoiding hazards in the workplace; responding to emergencies and accidents; basic first aid; healthy lifestyles; stress management
Worker and Employer Rights and Responsibilities	Rwandan labor code: including workers' rights, benefits, labor laws
Financial Literacy	Managing money; saving; budgeting; how financial institutions work; making financial decisions
Exploring Entrepreneurship	The cycle of business; entrepreneurship skills; planning for unexpected events; financial record-keeping; marketing; negotiating; adding value to products

In addition to the WRC, the AK model includes six other components:

1. Accelerated basic education (ABE) (e.g., Kinyarwanda literacy and numeracy, sometimes English fluency)
2. Technical training (TT) in a particular vocation (e.g., hospitality, construction)
3. Entrepreneurship training (e.g., income generating activities (IGA), small businesses)
4. Internship placement
5. AK graduate follow-up services (e.g., job placement and coaching)
6. Support for savings and loans groups to help youth entrepreneurs

## C. PROGRAM MODEL

Different components of the AK model (outlined above) are “bundled” together into different implementation variations. Each variation includes the WRC, and most include a mix of other components. Versions of the model were tailored toward the characteristics of targeted beneficiary groups (e.g., level of education, rural or urban residence, and access to formal employment) and local capacity available for providing training. (See Annex 2 for more information on the model) For example, youth with low levels of education and little access to formal employment might receive the WRC plus accelerated basic education and entrepreneurship training. Table 4 shows what components are included in each of the eight versions of the AK model, types of implementers, types of beneficiaries, number of implementers, and number of beneficiaries.

**Table 4: AK Model as Implemented from 2009 to 2013**

<b>Versions of the Model</b>	<b>ABE</b>	<b>WRC</b>	<b>TT</b>	<b>IGA</b>	<b>Internships</b>	<b>Job Placement</b>	<b>SLG</b>	<b>Type of IP</b>	<b>Type of Beneficiaries</b>	<b># of IPs</b>	<b># of Beneficiaries</b>
<b>1. Urban Classic</b>		✓	✓		✓	*		NGOs <sup>20</sup> , SMEs, SEs	Largely secondary completers, some OVCs	26	5,243
<b>2. In School Youth</b>		✓				*		NGOs, SEs	P4 and secondary completers, OVCs	4	616
<b>3. Peri-urban SLG</b>		✓				*	✓	NGOs	Mix of primary and secondary	2	1,904
<b>4. TVET</b>		✓	✓					WDA/ AVSI	Some secondary school	2	2,215
<b>5. RDB</b>		✓			✓			RDB & EDC	University graduates	1	1,127
<b>6. Rural Classic</b>		✓	✓	✓	✓	*	*	NGOs & SMEs	Mix of primary and secondary	3	792
<b>7. Rural SLG</b>		✓	✓	✓		*	✓	NGOs & SEs	Mix of primary and secondary	1	303
<b>8. ALP</b>	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		NGOs & SMEs	P4 minimum, dropped out before P6	7	700

Notes: \* Varies or minimal. “P4” is primary grade 4. “OVC” stands for Orphans and Vulnerable Children. Accelerated Basic Education (ABE); Work Readiness Curriculum (WRC); Technical Training (TT); Income Generating Activities (IGA); Social Enterprise (SE); Savings and Lending Groups (SLG); Small-Medium Enterprises (SMEs); Technical and Vocational Training (TVET); Rwanda Development Board (RDB); Accelerated Learning Program (ALP)

20. In this paper the term NGOs is used to refer to civil society organizations that both are registered as non-profit or charitable organizations and rely entirely or largely on grants and donor funding to support their operations. Social Enterprises (SEs) may be of non-profit, charitable or for-profit legal status--they apply business tools and philosophy in their work, e.g. they have business plans, marketing and sales, market analyses, and they also rely on earned income.

## D. MANAGEMENT, GRANTS, AND IMPLEMENTING PARTNERS

The Education Development Center, Inc. (EDC), under a USAID EQUIP3 Associate Award, is responsible for the overall implementation and management of the Akazi Kanoze program.<sup>21</sup> EDC's in-country management team, which will be referred to in this report as the Akazi Kanoze Management Unit (AKMU), handles on-the-ground operations. Implementation is primarily handled by small NGOs and private enterprises referred to as implementing partners (IPs). Through an Expression of Interest (EOI) process, EDC identifies and selects potential IPs to receive a Request for Applications (RFA). EDC evaluates IP applicants using a standard set of criteria that includes technical capacity, responsiveness to market and youth needs, experience working with youth (especially those to be served), connections to the private sector, and capacity to manage funds. IPs must conduct market analyses to show that their technical training prepares youth for jobs that match market demand and to prove to EDC that they have the ability to place youth in internships. After applicants are chosen, EDC and the IPs jointly develop a statement of work (SOW), which details target population, budget, and a technical training plan. EDC trains IPs in how to implement the WRC as well as financial management and M&E. EDC continues to coach and mentor IPs during implementation, in areas including tracking AK beneficiaries, M&E, and partnering with the private sector. EDC provides formal certificates documenting completion of training that are signed by both EDC and the WDA.<sup>22</sup>

As of March, 2013, EDC had partnered with 40 IPs and 14 technical vocational training and technical secondary schools. They include institutional partners such as the WDA, small local non-profit organizations that focus on assisting vulnerable groups (e.g., Benimpuhwe), private consulting companies (e.g., Frontiers Great Lakes<sup>23</sup>), and larger international NGOs (e.g., Esther's Aid for Needy and Abandoned Children). Each IP offers its own set of unique services; for instance Business Designing, Supplying and Services (BDSS), a for profit company, focuses on building youth's skills in information and communications technology (ICT). Another example is Catholic Relief Services which runs saving and lending programs aimed at improving entrepreneurial options for rural youth. AK has also been implemented on a small scale within the TVET system and the Rwanda Development Board (RDB) internship program. A list of implementing partners is included in Annex 5.

IPs are located in urban and rural areas. Each urban IP receives an average of 11 million RWF (approximately 18,000 USD) per year,<sup>24</sup> and each rural IP receives an average of 14 million RWF per year (approximately 23,000 USD).<sup>25</sup> Rural programs receive a higher amount of funding because logistics (e.g., long distances, challenging terrain) and the population's lower educational levels require a more resource-intensive approach to training. Most IPs have existing technical training programs that leverage AK funding. Depending on capacities and needs, IPs use AK grants to cover staff positions, various program activities, technical training, beneficiary transportation, and equipment costs. In addition to funding, IPs receive a standard support package, including teacher training, capacity building, and grants from the AKMU—the latter of which covers some of the costs of program implementation.

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21. EDC is a global nonprofit organization that works with private and public partners in the areas of health, education, and economic development.

22. WDA acts as the government accreditation entity.

23. Frontiers is a private consulting company in leadership and youth development that consults for EDC and is one of the AK IPs.

24. The exchange rate used for calculations throughout this study is approximately RF 630 per US\$.

25. This amount is calculated for a cohort of 100 youth. Urban IPs start usually with 1 cohort of 100 youth, then at time of renewal, this increases to as much as 300-400 youth per year. With economies of scale and the search for sustainability, when a partner renews with AK, the amount per 100 youth is usually less than the first grant. Figures for renewals for rural IPs are slightly lower than those for urban IPs.

## IV. ASSESSING THE SCALE UP AND SUSTAINABILITY OF THE MODEL

The following section discusses the opportunities and challenges of the AK model with regard to scale up and sustainability. It touches on the topics included in the analytical framework.

### A. EXPERIENCE WITH SCALING UP

To date, scaling up of the AK model has been largely opportunistic and focused on leveraging partnerships. The AK leadership has scaled up the program by (1) increasing the scope of the model (adding more components so as to appeal to a larger market); (2) certifying or funding different types of implementers; (3) spreading the program geographically from urban to rural; and (4) expanding the program demographically to various populations.<sup>26</sup> In addition to expanding its core WRC component to 8 different service packages, the program has gone from being implemented primarily by NGOs to being offered by social enterprises (in agriculture, microfinance, and ICT) and public sector institutions (RDB and TVET providers). Geographic scaling has occurred as the program has spread from urban to peri-urban and rural areas. In fact, it has gone to all five provinces in 18 districts as of 2013— three in Kigali Province and 15 districts in other provinces. Demographic scaling has taken place from the original target population of youth ages 15–25 with primary or secondary degrees to youth ages 25–35 with an educational attainment ranging from P4 to university graduates. Implementation of the various versions of the model has provided IPs and stakeholder with experience that they can draw on going forward to target beneficiary populations with appropriate versions of the model and scale though pathways make the most sense for reaching more youth sustainably. While looking at what worked was not done exceptionally rigorously, AK does have some knowledge of costs and benefits to draw on.

### B. ENABLING ENVIRONMENT

**Governance.** Rwandan governance is a very mixed picture. On the one hand, it is a highly effective in terms of setting and especially implementing policy, which has endeared it to foreign donors. According to Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) scorecards for Rwanda, while government effectiveness dramatically improved and are now relatively high, scores related to accountability, citizen participation, and civil liberties remain low and in some cases are declining.<sup>27</sup>

**Table 5: Rwanda’s percentile ranking in its MCC income group out of low income threshold countries**

Category	Percentile				
	2007	2010	2012	2013	2014
Political Rights	32	26	20	24	25
Civil Liberties	29	32	29	27	18
Control of Corruption	53	98	100	100	100
Government Effectiveness	31	94	97	100	100
Rule of Law	37	76	92	93	95
Voice and Accountability	21	26	22	n/a	n/a
Freedom of Information				20	20

Source: Millennium Challenge Corporation, n.d. Note: There are 58 low-income threshold countries category, including Afghanistan, Egypt, Ghana, Indonesia, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Somalia, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam.

26. These scaling activities are not mutually exclusive of each other.

27. See <http://www.mcc.gov/pages/selection/scorecards>.

On the other hand, public administrations at all levels are not interacting as efficiently as effectively as they could be in the coordination of government activities. The Decentralization Implementation Plan provides concrete steps forward and identifies benchmarks to be tracked. Building local capacity to coordinate and implement service delivery and administrative capability began during phase two, but it was problematic. Over the last 5 years, “insufficient coordination and communication across sectors as well as between central and local government entities meant that some of the impacts of the policies were not fully executed” (MINECOFIN, 2013). It is hoped that this will change during the third phase of the massive decentralization effort now underway in Rwanda. During phase 3, beginning in 2011, the GOR aims to build local coordination capacity and help local and central governments to adjust to their expected roles since the central government has been controlling and directing implementation roles rather adhering to its role as facilitator of local governance (MINALOC, 2011). One aspect of the implementation plan is the economic development and access to public services like education for youth. It also focuses on human resources development and local economic development through skills training in rural and urban areas. However, the plan stops short of setting targets for youth training or participation in economic development, and instead includes progress indicators related to youth involvement in budgeting and planning processes and the inclusion in budget proposals of strategies to create economic opportunities for youth. The results of implementation should be monitored by AK as it works with the WDA and local TVET providers.

In addition, productivity and youth employment are a theme of the Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy 2003-2018, which goes so far as to prioritize developing skills and attitudes and stimulating entrepreneurship. This includes such actions relevant to AK as strengthening TVET, promoting internships, setting up a three-party funding system for on-the-job training, and establishing a youth entrepreneurship mentoring program.

**Private Sector.** The business environment continues to be mixed for the private sector. It is particularly challenging to create and grow the kinds of enterprises where AK graduates might be expected to find employment. On the positive side, Rwanda does well on many formal measures of the business climate--it comes in 32<sup>nd</sup> on the World Bank's 2014 *Doing Business* economy rankings. This represents a steady improvement over the last several years--while Rwanda ranked 52<sup>nd</sup> and 139<sup>th</sup>, respectively, in the 2013 and 2009 reports. The ease of doing business has increased substantially during AK implementation.

These improvements are largely because of the government's attempts to improve the business climate since the introduction of a new commercial law in 2001. Rwanda has steadily reformed its commercial laws and institutions, and in the past year, it introduced a new company law that simplified business start-up and strengthened minority shareholder protections. Start a business now requires only two procedures and three days. Rwanda has also enacted new laws in order to improve regulations to ease access to credit. Other reforms reduced the time required to register property (World Bank, n.d.).

Unfortunately employment creation and foreign direct investment (FDI) slowed in 2012. Despite a huge jump in the rate of inflows of FDI in 2007/9, those rates are behind the average rates of developing Sub Saharan countries (World Bank, 2013) (See Table 5). Investors could be wary of making major investments given the concentrated nature of political and private sector leadership and its possible effects on the playing field. This could affect employers of AK participants who depend on foreign investment, as well as those wishing to grow their businesses.

**Table 6: Foreign Direct Investment, net inflows, as percent of GDP**

	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Rwanda	0.31	0.99	2.20	2.19	2.26	0.75	1.67	2.25
Sub-Saharan Africa (developing countries only)	3.19	2.41	3.57	4.57	4.06	2.90	3.11	2.88

Source: World Bank DataBank

**Access to finance.** Youth seeking to start micro and small enterprises also face significant challenges in getting access to small business services and capital. It is difficult for those with limited capital because of the lack of access to finance, the fees and regulations for registration, and a flat tax structure.<sup>28</sup> Most microfinance institutions (MFIs) require a current relationship with banking institutions and a large percentage of collateral to qualify for loans (OTF Group, 2010).

There are several government initiatives to address the financing issue, but so far a systemic effect has not been measured. One attempt by the GoR to address the problem of collateral is the Business Development Fund (BDF). As the Minister of Trade and Industry said, “The BDF will allow every Rwandan, who has a good business plan but no collateral, to access loans. We believe that this initiative will add to the number of SME’s [small and medium-sized enterprises] in the country, lowering the unemployment rate and increasing wealth” (GOR, n.d.).

### C. LEADERSHIP DRIVERS AND POLITICAL CONSTITUENCIES

**Governance.** Since 1994, the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) has been the main player in Rwandan government. Stakeholder interviews paint a picture of a strong executive who is accustomed to centralized control over governance decisions at the policy and programmatic levels. Informants reported that ministers and their deputies seek guidance from the presidential palace before making decisions. This is reflected in the revelations from the GOR’s decentralization strategy and its implementation goals, which aim to strengthen the local decision making power and set boundaries between levels of government. This pattern of seeking decision from more senior officials is repeated throughout government. This is equally true at the local government level, district level, and below, although it should be noted that institutional and policy reformed substantially altered and restructured local-level governance structures between 2001 and 2010 (MINALOC, 2011).<sup>29</sup> Previously, all government officials down to the district level were appointed by the central government (CCOAI, 2011), with elected district councils largely in a consultative role. In any case, TVET reform will be affected by decentralization and AK will have to navigate the changing balance of power and work with government officials with various capacities for decision making when charting its way forward.

#### POLITICAL CONSTITUENCIES

In addition to youth, key private sector, non-profit, and governmental stakeholders constitute a force for demanding and supporting the sustainability and scaling up of AK.

**Youth,** which are defined in Rwanda as 15-35 years old, are both politically and economically important. As seen in Table 6, nearly three-quarters of the population was under 30 years old in 2010. Thirty percent were 15-29 years old—the target population for AK—and an even greater share of the population was under 15. While youth are not necessarily a voting bloc per se, the government clearly understands

28. In multiple interviews and focus groups, AK graduates cited these as the most important obstacles to creating new businesses, and these views were confirmed in interviews with IP management.

29. The Rwandan administrative system is divided into four provinces plus the area of greater Kigali. Below the provincial level there are 30 districts which used to be called communes. Below districts are 416 sectors. The next levels are 2,148 cells and 14,837 villages.



that dealing with youth employment and livelihoods is not only essential for the future of the economy, but also a political priority.

**Table 7: Age Structure of Rwanda's Population, 2010**

Age	Percentage of the Population
0-4	17.5
5-9	13.3
10-14	11.5
15-19	10.6
20-24	10.5
25-29	9.4
>29	27.2

Source: US Census, International Database for 2010

Rwanda remains a largely rural and agricultural country and economy. With roughly 90 percent of the population in rural areas and over 40 percent of GDP still produced by agriculture, farmers and the rural population are an important political constituency. This is particularly true of farmers producing coffee, the country's largest source of export earnings, and tea.

**Civil society** is playing a growing role in Rwanda. Independent NGOs are most numerous and active at the local level. NGOs focus on service delivery at the cell, sector and district level, the three lowest levels of government in Rwanda, and less so on advocacy and influencing government policy. While many civil society organizations (CSOs) provide vocational training, education, and job placement, they are relatively unorganized and have little voice in society. The Rwanda Governance Advisory Council (RGAC) released a report discussing the need for Rwanda to create a vibrant civil society. In this report, the RGAC Executive Secretary said, "We need to empower civil society in order to enhance accountability and ensure better service delivery to the people" (Rwanda Governance Board, 2013).

**Parastatal NGOs.** The government typically consults the private sector and civil society through peak or umbrella organizations. Umbrella organizations have often been created by the government and represent NGOs, the private sector, the poor, women (Pro-Femmes), and veterans and the disabled.<sup>30</sup> For example, the Private Sector Federation (PSF) is such a parastatal organization.

The **Private Sector Federation (PSF)**, which acts as a national chamber of commerce, is one of the organizations most relevant to scaling up AK. Its role is to enable communication between the government and private sector as well as to find common ground in support of GOR policies. The PSF chairman is usually an ex-Minister or former manager of a major enterprise controlled by the RPF. Donors expressed concerns over the vitality of the private sector and the coordinating capacity of the PSF. One interviewee suggested that the situation could be improved by giving local private sector stakeholders a greater voice in policy and decision making, and by recruiting more innovative business leaders to staff the PSF. Most of PSF's members are from the formal sector, either large businesses or local branches of multi-nationals. While it has multiple members from all sectors, construction and hospitality are the two sectors relevant to AK that have the greatest representation. Moreover, as noted above, many of the larger private businesses are owned by the RPF, through its conglomerate or otherwise. The PSF was suggested as a member of the Rwandan Youth Opportunity Network (RYON) that was to be coalesced by AK because of its work in multiple sectors as well as the business development and entrepreneurship training it offers. PSF was also recognized as an important resource for job placement. Although RYON has not come together as anticipated, PSF has provided guidance to

30. See UNDP, "CIVICUS Civil Society Index Analytical Country Report for Rwanda," March 2011.

AK, and its connectedness to power structures could open doors for AK beneficiaries in the dominant businesses in the economy. At the same time, PSF members' and trainers' experiences with youth being placed in work, internships, or being assisted in entrepreneurship will affect PSF's view of AK and willingness to cooperate.

### **KEY STAKEHOLDERS AND INSTITUTIONS**

AK's relationships with government ministries and ensuring its political support of AK appears to be important to accessing a large part of the private sector. Major constituencies for the ruling party are military veterans and their families, as well as orphans from the genocide/war period and adult genocide survivors with children aged 15-29. The GOR has prioritized programs targeting veterans, orphans and other victims of the genocide and its aftermath.

One of the most prominent institutions underpinning skills development and training in Rwanda is **Itorero ry'Igihugu** (Itorero). Itorero is a GOR institution that embodies the Rwandan concept of *Imhigo*—setting targets and achieving them through civic engagement and mobilization – which has been promoted by the President. Itorero organizes civic education training programs for various groups of Rwandan citizens. The most visible component of Itorero is the twelve month National Service (URUGERERO) program that targets youth between the ages of 18 and 35 upon completion of their secondary education (Itorero, 2011). Large numbers of youth are trained in Rwandan history, health, patriotism and other values considered traditionally important, such as unity, responsibility, selflessness, and the importance of hard work. During key informant interviews, many Rwandan youth shared that they see participation in Itorero as necessary for their economic advancement because of the benefits and exposure it confers.


Within the government, there are a number of ministries which have played a role in the implementation of AK and are relevant for future scaling up. Their importance has changed over the last several years as roles and responsibilities have shifted within the government. Initially, primary responsibility for labor markets and vocational training was with the **Ministry of Labor (MINFOTRA)**; meanwhile, the Ministry of Education (MINEDUC) had responsibility for the formal education system.<sup>31</sup> The creation of the Rwanda Development Board (RDB) was one contributor to a shift in leadership on economic development from MINFOTRA, which resulted in the RDB absorbing several employment and training responsibilities. The RDB was established by law in 2008 with several responsibilities related to economic development, including for developing human capacity (GOR, 2008). In 2008 the GOR issued its national TVET policy under which all technical and vocational training was to be centralized under the Ministry of Education. A year later the Workforce Development Authority (WDA) was created to sit under The **Ministry of Education (MINEDUC)** with the mission to “promote, facilitate, and guide the development and upgrading of skills and competencies of the national workforce in order to enhance competitiveness and employability” (WDA, n.d.). The WDA's strategic plan stipulates a number of actions it will take as the agency in charge of TVET in Rwanda, including consolidating the system, establishing quality control, and complying with the national gender policy.

The MINEDUC has emerged as the most important government partner for AK because of its control of both formal and vocational education, the latter known as the TVET system.

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31. For a more detailed description and analysis of the TVET system, see John Gaga and Ibrahim C. Musobo, “Mapping Study – LEARN4WORK TVET-Food Security Situation in Rwanda” Kigali, October 2012. Edukans, Netherlands. Especially Part 2, pp. 41-62. This section draws heavily on that document as well as interviews with WDA staff and others.

**Figure 1: MINEDUC Organizational Structure**



Within the MINEDUC TVET system there are several types of schools: 1) Vocational Training Centers (VTCs); 2) Technical Secondary Schools (TSSs); and 3) Colleges of Technology (COTs) – all with varying entry requirements. At the top of the TVET pyramid are **Integrated Polytechnic Regional Centers (IPRCs)**. IPRCs are responsible for the highest levels of technical and vocational education and for strengthening and supervising the VTCs and TSSs. The GOR has targeted having all five IPRCs operational by the end of 2013. Both VTCs and TSSs can either be public, private or run by NGOs.<sup>32</sup>

*TVET in Rwanda is provided by both the private and the public sector. Private providers may be parents associations, association of individuals, groups of people, religious organizations or NGOs. Public providers may be government schools or government aided/subsidized schools which are former private schools which have been handed to government for support and joint-running due to the owners' financial constraints.*

*Private schools are fully funded through school fees collection from students and are independent in their recruitment.*

*Finances of Government or subsidized schools are fully supported by government for the running of the schools and the latter depend solely on the government for teachers and students recruitment.*

--Excerpt from Gaga & Musobo, 2012, p. 40-41

Roughly 80 percent of the 278 VTCs and TSSs were privately run in 2012. The government has set as a goal of shifting 60 percent of all secondary students to the TVET system by 2017 (New Times Rwanda, 2012),<sup>33</sup> implying strong political support and high expectations. Looking at current gross enrollment rates for all secondary in the EdStats database, in 2012 there were a reported 534,712 students enrolled in all public and private secondary programs. Sixty percent of that is 320,827 students (World Bank,

32. These usually received some kind of government aid.

n.d.). EdStats shows annual increases in secondary enrollment of around 50,000 students, which would mean around 471,000 students studying in TVET schools in 2017 and around 1,700 students per each TVET provider based on the current total of 278 providers. As acknowledged by the government, the current number and quality of TVET schools are inadequate to meet these policy targets.<sup>34</sup> A major challenge will be furnishing providers with sufficient equipment, especially for vocations which require expensive equipment for training (e.g. automobile mechanics and various types of engineering), though the GOR states that it has sufficient donor funding in place. The government is counting on civil society to play a part in the construction of the necessary TVET schools, especially through the monthly community work program, Umuganda.

**Table 8: Distribution of TVET schools by type and location**

	TSS		VTCs		TVET Schools Total #	% of Total Schools
	Public or Govt. Aided	Private	Public or Govt. Aided	Private		
Kigali	1	32	1	27	61	22
South	9	24	15	21	69	25
West	16	21	8	16	61	22
North	9	16	2	11	38	14
East	8	13	12	16	49	18
Total	43	106	38	91	278	-
Total Schools per Type	149		129		278	
% of Total Schools per Type	29	71	29	71	-	-

Source: List of TVET providers from WDA, 2012, as adapted from Gaga and Musobo, Table 6

The **Workforce Development Authority (WDA)** is in charge of regulating, supervising and managing the MINEDUC TVET system, including certification and accreditation. Its other responsibilities include developing curriculum and standards; monitoring and inspection of those standards; training public and private TVET teachers and trainers; promoting employment of TVET graduates through entrepreneurship; and developing and implementing the Rwandan TVET Qualification Framework (RTQF). WDA is less than four years old and its purview is enormous: as of early 2013 they were working on an overall TVET strategy, a training of trainer strategy, and an implementation plan for the RTQF.

**Excerpt from Strategies of WDA**

- To establish 5 IPRCs in the five regions of Rwanda
- To absorb and align all TSSs and VTCs with the national TVET arrangement
- To develop partnership with industry
- To implement the accreditation of industry-based training programmes
- To integrate the established TQF into the National Qualifications Framework (NQF)
- To develop a national TVET certification system
- Publicity of TVET & WDA & Promotion of National Policy based Gender balance in all preceding strategies
- To put in place qualified and competent TVET lecturers & instructors in accordance with the National Gender Policy

Source: WDA, n.d.

34. Part of the strategy to achieve this is to ensure that there are 90 well-equipped TVET schools in the country, with at least three in each district. The GOR plans to do this by converting existing general education schools into TVET institutions.

The capacities of MINEDUC, WDA, and the TVET system are mixed.<sup>35</sup> There are no institutionalized processes for setting policy; in fact, policy tends to be shaped by the preferences of the Minister of Education, Ministers of State, and WDA's director general. For example, at times the various MINEDUC leaders have had no interest in life skills training such as that offered by Akazi Kanoze, while at other times they have been strong supporters.

WDA lacks solid internal strategic planning capacity, so that creating strategies for the TVET system as a whole and implementing the RTQF and TOT have relied on donor assistance. The lack of senior management capacity has also hampered coordination and integration of donor assistance. Similarly, WDA simply doesn't have sufficient human resource capacity to either provide the necessary TOT and follow-up mentoring and supervision, nor to regulate and accredit TVET providers, especially the private ones. Interviews with the management of individual institutions indicated that accreditation visits were superficial and perfunctory, assessing number of students served or whether curriculum is being followed rather than the quality of instruction or actual learning outcomes. Currently the WDA does not have its own staff of permanent trainers, but hires them on a contract basis. These limitations are particularly challenging for implementing the new competency-based approach, as it is resource intensive for training, instruction and examination.

The capacity of the TVET schools themselves is generally weak.<sup>36</sup> Linkages between schools and the private sector/employers are still fairly limited with only a small number of TVET providers offering apprenticeships, internships or placement assistance. Because of this, the relevance of TVET curricula and learning to private sector needs is widely regarded as poor. Improving linkages between TVET providers and the private sector is a major goal of the WDA, but so far little has been done. Some providers have their own revenue generation through enterprises, e.g. furniture or clothing manufacturing, or have been the beneficiaries of foreign aid. While these institutions are well equipped, the vast majority is not, so that the quality of learning is uneven.

The quality of TVET directors and teachers is perhaps the most glaring weakness. Directors are largely unsupervised, apart from perfunctory annual visits, and how they run the schools is largely idiosyncratic. Some directors are entrepreneurial, generate internal revenues, and develop relationships with the local private sector, but the majority do not. Teachers receive very little training and no ongoing coaching or mentoring, apart from the occasional donor project.<sup>37</sup> Most teachers are very poorly paid, usually supplementing their salaries by teaching at multiple schools, doing their own work in the field in which they teach, or both. As a result, teacher turnover is quite high. As Gaga and Musobo concluded, "Most private TVET providers are poorly equipped and have difficulties hiring qualified trainers on a permanent basis. The general observation is that the majority of TVET providers, which unfortunately are private, are still struggling in their effort to offer what would be called 'relevant and quality TVET' and seem to be providing more theoretical rather than practical training to their learners."

The WDA benefits from enormous political support from the highest levels of the GOR because of the centrality of its mission to the government's development and education strategy. There is clearly strong demand for technical and vocational training, and interest from the private sector in partnership and support. The combination of both GOR policy and political support has led multiple donors to move into this area, so there is strong donor support through financing and capacity building. On the other hand, the WDA has a limited domestic budget and its internal capacity is very much a work in progress;

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35. The sources for this paragraph are interviews with bilateral donors involved in working with WDA, interviews with WDA staff, interviews with EDS staff that work with the TVET system, visits to individual TVET institutions, and a review of various documents assessing the TVET system.

36. This observation is based on field visits to several TVET schools, interviews, and documents.

37. There is no technical teachers training institute in the country, though IPRCs will eventually fulfill that role

whether it is capable of absorbing, managing and coordinating the extensive donor support intended to address these challenges is uncertain. The low capacity of the WDA and TVET institutions present a challenge to scaling up of AK, whether donor and GOR will address this issue remains to be seen.

**MYICT** has been tasked with playing a role in promoting entrepreneurship amongst youth, which includes creating youth centers where youth can access the internet, obtain small business assistance and technical support, and possibly receive small loans and grants. The centerpiece of the MYICT's current efforts and most relevant for AK is the Ministry's Youth Empowerment for Global Opportunity (YEGO) centers. YEGOs are intended to be one-stop shops for youth where they can access multiple programs. These programs include entrepreneurship, employability (e.g., language and ICT training), job placement, talent identification and incubation (the most targeted sectors are the music industry and arts), empowering youth to take an active role in theirs and Rwanda's development through participating in sports, living a healthy lifestyle, volunteering, and youth employment research and advocacy. One YEGO center is allocated to each of the 30 districts, and it is planned for one to exist in each of the 416 sectors in 5 years. Services are intended to be free and be delivered by a variety of providers. For example, at one YEGO, RDB interns teach ICT, VSO volunteers teach English, and Digital Opportunities Trust delivers entrepreneurship training.

The **Rwanda Development Board (RDB)** is in charge of promoting all investment in Rwanda, especially foreign direct investment. Its leadership reports directly to the President. The scope of its work includes anything to do with private sector development, and it in fact has become the *de facto* lead economic agency in the country.<sup>38</sup> Given that the RPF has steadily pursued a policy of economic privatization and liberalization, this has translated into a broad mandate for the RDB to engage in any activity related to modernizing the Rwandan economy. Its emphasis on technology and entrepreneurship exemplify ways RDB is meeting this mandate. In addition to investment, the RDB is involved in numerous other activities, including human capital and institutional development; training and development of entrepreneurs; and addressing gaps between the labor force and skills needed by the private sector.<sup>39</sup> Its programs include Career Education Advisory Services, the Rwanda Youth Internship program, and an Entrepreneurship Development Program. RDB does not provide TVET education and training. It is not clear whether there is an overlap in the type of entrepreneurship training offered by the WDA and RDB. The RDB cooperates with the WDA, but the WDA focuses more on strengthening the TVET system while the RDB approaches collaboration from a private sector standpoint.

As part of its efforts to promote entrepreneurship, the RDB initiated **Business Development Service Centers (BDSCs)**. The centers rely on public-private partnerships – management of BDSCs has been contracted out to four providers – and are intended to provide a variety of services to small businesses. In principle, BDSCs facilitate access to financial institutions and capital, teach business skills, and facilitate private and foreign investment. The study team's visits to a few centers indicated that the services offered are quite limited and help with tax filing, formal registration of a business, use of the internet and computers, and creating a business plan for obtaining bank loans. BDSCs also offer basic training in using computers and the Internet, bookkeeping, managing SMEs, and other business skills. All the services are provided on a fee-for-service basis, with a few exceptions. Staffing is largely comprised of university students or recent graduates with a degree in accounting, with no formal training or background in business planning, training or teaching. Unfortunately these centers may have limited impact because of poor implementation and a lack of access by new entrepreneurs with an inability to pay for service fees.

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38. Its mission and vision are: "To transform Rwanda into a dynamic global hub for business, investment, and innovation by enabling private sector growth."

39. Information Communication Technology, Asset and Business Management, Trade and Manufacturing, Human Capital and Institutional Development, Agriculture, Services Development and Tourism and Conservation.

Despite those characteristics the GOR is establishing a set of services aimed at supporting job seekers and young entrepreneurs that will be implemented through the BDSCs, the Ministry of Youth and Information and Communication Technology's (MYICT's) Youth Employment for Global Opportunities (YEGO) centers, and other initiatives with similar capacity and capabilities (MINECOFIN, 2013).

The majority of employment is with informal private sector businesses, and youth make up a little over half of those employees. Ninety percent of both informal and partially formal enterprises employ only one or two workers. The formal private sector is still developing and makes up less than 10 percent of the economy. The 2011 World Bank Enterprise Survey<sup>40</sup> for Rwanda describes the characteristics of 241 firms, the majority of which were located in Kigali. On average, firms were around 9 years old. Ownership of small and medium firms was around 80-90 percent domestic while ownership of large firms was 65 percent domestic. The government was not involved in ownership except for around three percent of large firms. Almost 50 percent of small firms were sole proprietorships. Overall, 89.8 percent of firms surveyed were formally registered when they started operations and almost 57 percent see themselves as competing against informal firms. In terms of workforce, 45.6 percent of large firms identified an inadequately educated workforce as a constraint along with 28.5 of medium companies and 25.6 of small companies. Companies offer formal training, with 81.5 percent of large firms doing so while 62 percent of medium and 48 percent of small firms also doing so., "Employers often resort to imported labor" because of a shortage of local workers who can fill vacancies in the construction, automotive and hospitality industries (McLellan & Bamwesigye, 2012).

The key stakeholders discussed here and additional ones are further elaborated in Annex 4.

#### **D. AK PARTNERSHIPS AND CAPACITY BUILDING**

**AK Partnerships.** Leadership in scaling up to date has come largely from the AK Chief of Party (COP), who is also head of the Akazi Kanoze Management Unit (AKMU). The COP and AK staff have built strong relationships and credibility with government officials in key agencies as well as the private sector and NGOs. This has positioned AK to take advantage of opportunities and to forge important partnerships. For example, AK developed and has maintained a close and positive relationship with the Imbuto Foundation and therefore the presidential administration (which has sent representatives to AK events).<sup>41</sup>

An important organization is the Imbuto Foundation. Initially focusing on issues around HIV/AIDS, it has broadened its focus to girl's health, education, leadership and economic empowerment. In interviews, Imbuto's leadership conveyed appreciation of how AK took advantage of existing resources, developed partnerships with multiple agencies, and achieved significant scale in Kigali. Imbuto regularly refers vulnerable girls to participate in AK programming.<sup>42</sup> The Imbuto leadership was supportive of seeing the Work Readiness Curriculum integrated into I2+, an adolescent girl's empowerment program piloted by the Nike Foundation and DFID, which is now going to scale with strong government support.

EDC has also successfully created partnerships with several government agencies. As noted above, MINUDEEC, WDA, and government officials have been under pressure from the highest levels to show results in terms of youth livelihoods and employment training, placement in actual jobs, or creation of new enterprises. With limited funds and implementation capacity of their own, they have welcomed any opportunity to partner with projects that support these aims. AK has facilitated events celebrating youth

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40. World Bank enterprise surveys provide information on trends in business ownership.

41. See, for example, Rwanda: Jeannette Kagame on the frontline promoting youth empowerment--  
<http://www.togetherrwanda.com/2012/10/rwanda-jeannette-kagame-on-the-frontline-promoting-youth-empowerment/>

42. See, for example, the Imbuto Foundation's January-March 2013 quarterly newsletter--  
[http://imbutofoundation.org/IMG/pdf/january\\_2013\\_newsletter.pdf](http://imbutofoundation.org/IMG/pdf/january_2013_newsletter.pdf)

livelihood and employment that feature GOR officials—including ministers and the First Lady. The ceremonies and media coverage raised AK's profile and its status with the WDA and other ministries.

The most important operational partnership for AK has been with the MINEDUC, and the WDA in particular. AK developed relationships with the WDA by regularly attending the education sector and subsector working groups on behalf of USAID to create visibility. It is not clear why USAID staff is not attending these meetings. They spent time looking for opportunities to build partnerships and relationships.

At the request of WDA, AK developed an entrepreneurship program for use by the TVET schools; in return, WDA piloted the WRC in the Southern Province, which eventually led to the integration of WRC into all of the new TVET curricula that have been developed since then. Other agencies, such as MYICT, MIFOTRA, Itorero, and the National Youth Council have also expressed interest in integrating the AK WRC into their programs.

Another major achievement was the agreement by MINEDUC and WDA to certify AK graduates with an official stamp on their graduation certificates.<sup>43</sup> AK was successful in achieving certification through multiple, complementary pathways. As a result of these efforts, several senior government officials strongly support scaling up of AK.

AK has also been building partnerships between employment training providers and the private sector. As part of capacity-building training, the EDC offers IPs information on strategies for forging effective partnerships with private sector employers. At the project level an EDC Private Sector Specialist (PSS) trains IPs in how to build these relationships. As many IPs do not have strong linkages to the private sector, the PSS often does much of the private sector relationship building and linking herself. “The EDC/Akazi Kanoze private sector specialist worked with the private sector stakeholders to conduct market surveys, identify current and potential economic opportunities, and strengthen the education and training programs of youth-serving organizations” (McLellan & Bamwesigye, 2012).<sup>44</sup> EDC also helps build these relationships by organizing networking meetings between private sector employers and IP staff. If scaling up is to happen without the AKMU, provisions for support in building partnerships with the private sector would be necessary.

**AK Capacity Building.** One of the main goals of AK is to “enable local institutions (e.g., government, private sector, civil society) to better prepare youth for work” (EDC, 2010). Therefore, IPs participate in a capacity-building program. The program is targeted to meet the specific organizational needs of each institution and to build the capacity of the network as a whole. It includes technical assistance and training in areas such as the delivery of workforce education and training services; career counseling and job placement services; understanding labor market demand and working with the private sector; and organization and management. The minimum capacity-building package provided to all implementing partners includes training of trainers on the WRC, financial management, and monitoring and evaluation.

These capabilities are strengthened through ongoing training and support outlined in each IPs individually tailored capacity-building plan. In addition, EDC provides IPs with strategic planning assistance and helps each of them develop transition strategies for graduates. EDC also provides free training materials and, in some cases, equipment to IPs. All of these efforts have built youth-serving IP organizations that could support scaling up of the AK model however, this raises the question of how capacity-building efforts will continue to be offered in a scaled-up version of the program no longer funded by USAID.

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43. Official certification of a diploma is essential for it to have any credibility with employers, especially in the formal sector.

44. The 2012 midterm evaluation recommends that IPs bring their own PSSs on staff.



EDC and AK have not engaged in capacity building of the management of any government (or other) agencies that might serve as vehicles for scaling up.<sup>45</sup> In principle, the most natural candidate for taking over management and delivery of the program would be WDA. However, neither the WDA nor the MINEDUC currently have the technical and management capacity to scale up WRC throughout the TVET system. There is no obvious candidate for scaling up all of the components of AK in either the government or private sector. The one possible exception would be the PSF, as the leadership of the PSF has expressed interest in playing some sort of future role in implementing AK. However the PSF does not have the technical knowledge of employment and livelihoods training, the management and training capacity, or the organizational resources to do so on any large scale.

## E. MECHANISMS FOR COORDINATION OF IMPLEMENTERS AND PARTNERS

During the AK project, EDC attempted to create the Rwanda Youth Opportunities Network (RYON), which is made up of government agencies, private sector employers, local and international NGOs, and donor organizations. It was hoped that the group would provide a platform for sharing information and building relationships, while creating potential opportunities for sustainability of AK after the end of USAID funding. Unfortunately, the group operates more loosely than originally hoped due to a lack of financial and human resources, political will, and coordination.

At the time the study team was doing its field work, EDC was coordinating four RYON sub-groups—industry, WRC trainers, IP leadership, and AK alumni—that meet regularly to discuss their work. These groups also host additional meetings on specific topics of interest, for example, the hospitality industry. While these groups provide an opportunity for information sharing and relationship building over the long term, they do not necessarily offer a solid grounding for coordination of AK scaling up.

## F. PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION AND SCALE UP

**Management Challenges to Scaling the AK Model.** While the WRC is the core package offered by AK and can be scaled up by itself, as has been shown by its adoption by providers of workforce development training (e.g., I2+ program, WDA’s TVET curricula—as noted earlier). EDC estimates that it takes 2–3 years of training, supervision, coaching, and monitoring for an implementing organization to deliver the WRC at high quality. This is for several reasons. First, the WRC training is as much about the pedagogic approach as it is about the actual content. Many Rwandan trainers are not familiar with a learner centered approach— and are more comfortable with traditional, didactic teaching methods. This is particularly true of TVET teachers. Second, existing trainers are not used to providing training in which each module includes a work product that is included in student’s portfolios (e.g. vision statements, job application letters, résumés). Finally, most IPs do not have systems to monitor their own results and using the data for continuous improvement. All of these factors are particularly at play for IPs that do not have their own trainers or whose trainers do not have experience working with youth. In interviews, IPs reported that is difficult for them to achieve a high level of WRC quality without investments in the time and resources of an external source (e.g., regular coaching and mentoring).

Finally, most models of AK include several components in addition to WRC. The advantages of the most comprehensive versions are that they address other pieces of employment training, including placement. However, delivering a complete AK model is very resource-intensive and requires more effort to ensure quality.

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45. The one exception is one of the IPs which is a for-profit and is run by a consultant who also works for AK. However, based on an interview with both this individual and the AK staff, he is not interested in assuming the role of managing AK after the end of EDC’s involvement. Moreover, while he has the knowledge and technical capacity, it is not clear if he has the organizational size or resources to assume that role even if he was willing.

**Resources Needed to Reduce Barriers to Participation.** Although EDC has taken measures to reduce barriers to participation in AK programming, some still exist. Financial considerations seem to be the primary obstacle to accessing the program. Transportation costs, especially in rural areas, can be prohibitive. In addition, rural students staying in Kigali to attend the program experience financial challenges due to the relatively high cost of room and board. Fees required by some IPs for equipment and uniforms also can be barriers for youth.

To overcome the cost barriers, some IPs provide reimbursement for transportation and pay equipment fees. They also incorporate a flexible program schedule (so some youth can choose to work) and provide lunch. Average costs for lunch and transportation are RF1,600 and RF500 per youth per day respectively or \$2.53 and \$0.79. The cost of start-up kits varies widely depending on the particular vocation, with carpenters tools or a sewing machine on the low end and the hardware for working on electronics at the high end. According to IPs, a rough average of what they provide is RF= 125,000, or approximately US\$200/youth. These are needed resources that would have to be considered when scaling the AK model.

Education-level requirements also hold some youth back from entering the program. While the bar is not particularly high, young people must have completed P4 and either have a P6 diploma or pass an equivalency assessment (literacy and numeracy) that is normed to the P6 level. This is mostly an issue in rural and peri-urban areas, and among older youth who have not benefited from universal primary education. To mitigate the educational barrier, AK has created the Accelerated Learning Program (ALP) that incorporates work-readiness focused content as appropriate, and which helps youth quickly move from a P4 to P6 level. When thinking about scaling up the program to more educationally disadvantaged youth, the ALP option should be a key consideration. While it would certainly require more funding than offering the WRC alone, the actual cost is not known.

**Providing Youth Financial Support to Get Started.** Lack of start-up capital and access to credit are the main barriers to youth developing their own businesses. It is very difficult for disadvantaged young people who have no relationship with banking institutions and no collateral to receive loans. Some versions of AK have attempted to address this by including participation in savings and lending group (SLG). This is particularly necessary in rural areas where the vast majority of graduates will need to start their own businesses given the lack of employment opportunities as compared with Kigali. Of course, part of the message of AK, and appropriately so, is that graduates can engage in some IGAs even with small amounts of capital (e.g., animal husbandry), and build the necessary capital over time. In some cases, this has allowed graduates to purchase the necessary tools or equipment in a year or two.

In vocations and locations where SLGs do not provide adequate capital, IPs have innovated other ways of providing needed startup equipment and funds. Some IPs have used grant money to create pools of financing available to youth who have developed viable business plans. Consideration will need to be given to including these components in areas where employment opportunities are lacking if an evaluation provides evidence of their effectiveness.

**Placement.** AK places students with a variety of **private and public sector employers**. Private employers represent a number of sectors: construction, hospitality, tailoring, hairdressing, car repair, agribusiness, and retail (called commerce, selling and marketing). In summary, the most AK graduates have been placed in construction, followed closely by hospitality and then agribusiness. The smallest number of graduates was placed in retail. Of all the construction trades, most graduates were placed in masonry and the fewest were placed in plumbing. Older graduates and those with more education (S4-

S6) were more likely to be placed. Men were only slightly more likely to be placed than women, with 48.66% female placed versus 51.34%.<sup>46</sup>

**Gender Considerations.** Sex-disaggregated data on AK participants and graduates show that at least 48 percent of beneficiaries have been female.<sup>47</sup> Both young women and men alike have demonstrated an initial tendency to seek employment in gender-normative vocational training opportunities. Women have experienced a higher probability of ending up self-employed. EDC has been pro-active in addressing differences in vocational choices by encouraging IPs to actively engage young women in non-traditional sectors (e.g., plumbing). Additionally, IPs have recruited female graduates who work in traditionally male vocations to speak with young women just entering the program. One IP (AVSI) is implementing a program that intentionally places female participants in sectors traditionally dominated by men. Scaling-up activities should consider how gender roles affect male and female beneficiaries' participation and encourage and support females interested in pursuing employment that is traditionally considered the domain of men.

## G.PROGRAM DEMAND

There are numerous factors that highlight the strong demand for AK programming, including the youth bulge phenomenon; the documented skills gap for youth wanting to secure employment; employer complaints that youth lack the soft skills necessary for work; and the government's prioritization of youth employment as a policy imperative. Of particular note is that employers clearly value soft skills (managing conflicts, time management, and customer service, etc.) when hiring new employees, and the AK model fills this particular need via the WRC. Reports from IPs and employers suggest that there are four to five times as many applicants as training spots available. This demonstrates a very strong incentive for scaling up the AK model, and the WRC in particular.

**Perceptions of the Program.** Both employers and graduates expressed appreciation for AK in interviews, focus groups, and on AK-administered surveys. In fact, many comments on the AK Employer Survey demonstrate positive perceptions of the program. For example, one respondent said, "The Akazi Kanoze youth have excellent discipline and enjoy working in a team." Another said, "They [AK youth] are team players, and they are skilled in good customer service" (EDC, 2012b).

The results of the survey were supported by field visit interviews with employers and feedback from employers shared by IP staff. For example, the owner of one of the largest security companies in Kigali not only prefers to hire AK graduates, but also has recommended them to two other businesses. He noted that "they provide good services compared to those who are not trained" (Personal communication, February 18, 2013). Specifically, he said that AK graduates provide better customer care, demonstrate good values, display positive facial expressions, report to work on time, and dress more smartly and appropriately than others. Two managers of prominent hotels in Kigali that take AK interns expressed strong appreciation of the program. They both stated that graduates had very strong soft skills, and found them particularly valuable in positions where customer interaction was important. They specifically mentioned that customers appreciated graduates punctuality, politeness, and a problem-solving mentality. They have hired interns as permanent staff both in customer service positions and in other areas, such as kitchen preparation, and have been highly satisfied. They like the internship program a lot, as it allows them an evaluation period to see if an individual makes a good employee. The same comments were echoed by Nakumatt management, an upscale grocery chain that has hired a number of AK graduates. AK graduates now make up the majority of the Nakumatt staff;

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<sup>46</sup> Data as of 2015.

<sup>47</sup> Calculations based on data provided by EDC's Akazi Kanoze office in Kigali, Rwanda.

some of which have moved up into positions of responsibility.<sup>48</sup>

There appears to be some willingness by private sector employers to pay for AK training. Frontiers, the AK's IP in Kigali that has the most experience and competence with the program, is already successfully offering training based on the AK model to corporate employees. The same two hotel managers referenced above stated that they would be willing to pay for this program, though no specific amounts were discussed. One said that they are part of chain of East African hotels based in Kenya, and regularly fly staff to Nairobi at the cost of a flight, several days in a hotel, not to mention the training itself. They found the quality of AK training superior to what they're getting for existing staff in Nairobi, and would welcome the opportunity to provide AK training to existing staff and all new hires. Given that the cheapest flights are over \$300 round-trip, it appears that, at least for this hotel, willingness and ability to pay is not an issue. While it is important to remember that these kind of well-paying, 3-4 star Kigali hotels represent only a fraction of employment in Rwanda, as does formal employment more generally, this could be a niche for AK graduates and it is notable that hospitality training does not limit a graduate to hotel service. The head of one of the largest providers of private security in Kigali who hires AK graduates (a major source of employment; they also do cleaning services, landscaping and gardening) stated that he would be willing to pay for AK training, but would need to figure out how to recoup those expenses from employees.

There appears to be some possibility for non-vulnerable youth to help pay for AK training themselves. Several IPs, as of spring 2013, were planning on introducing WRC courses on a fee-basis, for roughly \$45-50 per person or roughly RF30,000. The leadership of one Implementing Partner, Esther's Aid, suggested that they might be able to charge at least RF60,000 (about \$95) for the full program. This may or may not cover the full cost of AK, but could offset some of the costs.

During the field visit, youth shared their great appreciation for the skills they have developed through AK. Eighty-three percent of youth surveyed for the AK mid-term evaluation, "agreed or strongly agreed that the training had improved and strengthened their job interview skills, their ability to write a strong CV, and their ability to seek and secure employment" (EDC, 2012b). All focus group participants stated that many of the WRC modules were very valuable to them, especially customer service, personal savings and financial management, setting personal goals, and learning to start a business. However a consistent complaint was that many IPs do not offer much choice of technical training and in some occasions they aren't told in advance what vocational training(s) will be available; anecdotal evidence suggests that as many as half of the participants do not want to be in their current vocational track.

**Lack of Alternatives to AK.** In general, there is high demand for AK programming because there are very few alternatives to the training that it provides.<sup>49</sup> At all of the IPs interviewed for this study, there was clearly a higher demand for AK than the number of slots available. This was reflected in interviews with participants and graduates—many stated that they participated in AK because there were no alternative training programs available, especially in rural areas. Youth recognized the need for training that imparts real job skills beyond formal training, and a palpable sense need for such programs.

While capacity to pay appears to be low--many participants would not be able to attend without meal and transportation stipends--the fact that a large number of students spend hours traveling to attend underlines that AK is meeting a strongly felt need. This is reconfirmed by the AK completion data (See Annex 6); nearly 90 percent of entrants complete the program.

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48. AK management confirmed that these comments were generally representative of feedback from tourism and hotel management partners in Kigali, especially the appreciation for soft skills and a customer friendly, problem solving attitude which they claim is uncommon among Rwandans.

49. The Stryde curriculum, developed and delivered by Technoserve is similar, but has not received the attention or recognition of Akazi Kanoze. When the research team asked, in interviews with donors or senior government officials, what comparable programs there were to WRC, the Stryde program was not mentioned. See <http://www.technoserve.org/project/stryde>

No interviewees—including those from the WDA, MYICT, MIFOTRA, and several donors—were able to name another program in Rwanda that addresses the soft skills necessary to prepare young people for work. In this respect, the WRC is unique in addressing youth’s missing skill set and thereby filling this market niche in Rwanda.

While one alternative to AK is the formal TVET offered by public and private providers, at the time the study team was on the ground it only provided technical training, which is much less relevant in rural areas where entrepreneurship training is of higher interest. However, the WDA plans to introduce entrepreneurship related training as a part of its strategic plan. In addition, TVET institutions require students to have an S3 degree to enter. This excludes a significant number of youth who have not achieved that educational level. In the long run—once universal primary and secondary education are working—it is possible that there may be less of a need for an alternative to TVET education; but, it will take many years for that to work through the Rwanda population pyramid.

Government officials also believe there is a need for the AK programming. The head of human capital and institutional development at the RDB said that if resources would allow, he would like all interns in a RDB training program to complete AK as well. Most of them have experience with only the WRC part of the program, and thus see this as the primary component that would be added to their existing programming. No government official was willing to comment on or off the record in terms of actual willingness to pay or commit budgetary resources.

## H. MEASURING EVIDENCE OF PROGRAM SUCCESS

**M&E system.** Quantitative data collected includes the number of youth who enroll in an AK training program, how many complete the program, scores on participant WRC examinations, and whether or not youth find economic opportunities. Economic opportunities are disaggregated into internships, employment, self-employment, having returned to school, or still looking. EDC derived the program indicators from various sources including the USAID Foreign Assistance Framework and GOR indicators.

Tracking graduates has been a challenge for the M&E team, but they have developed innovative solutions including mobile tracking and training alumni to serve as “student trackers.” EDC’s SMS system developed with Souktel helps to track graduates in the medium-term after they complete an AK training program,<sup>50</sup> and allows AK to conduct surveys with youth.<sup>51</sup>

All IPs are trained in the monitoring and evaluation (M&E) system so they are able to comply with the data collection and reporting requirements. All data collected from IPs, employers, and beneficiaries is housed in an Access database managed by the AK M&E team; this team regularly conducts analysis for quarterly reports, annual reports, and ad hoc requests. This M&E function would need to be continued after USAID funding ends. Unfortunately, it appears that there is currently no public or private institution capable of filling this role.

**Evidence of success.** The evidence in terms of completion and placement is presented in Annex 6. Eighty-eight percent of youth in AK completed the program, and there seems to be little difference between men and women in either enrollment or completion rates. Not surprisingly, youth who had completed S6 (upper secondary school) had the highest completion rates, as did youth under age 20.

About half (45 percent) of those who completed an AK training program found a placement such as an internship, job, or self-employment within 6 months of graduation, which is when this data is collected.

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50. EDC has tracked 1,109 graduates, 432 of who reported being employed.

51. EDC has reached out to over 6,000 youth using this feature.

A quarter of AK graduates found jobs.<sup>52</sup> The estimates of the number of graduates who found jobs are understated because the statistics are gathered based on the first placement after graduation. Those who first go into internships are not counted as employed even if they subsequently find jobs, and interviews with employers suggest that a significant number of interns are subsequently hired.

Placement rates are higher for men than women who completed the program by September 2012--47 percent versus 39 percent. For men, both those with low and those with high educational attainment did better in finding opportunities than those in the middle with a lower secondary education. This suggests that the areas of the market targeted for and by men (ICT, car repair, and construction) contain more low- and high-skilled opportunities, and that those in the middle choose not to pursue low-skilled opportunities but cannot compete as effectively for higher skilled opportunities.

Women's placements also reflected this trend, but higher educational attainment was correlated with a slightly larger placement numbers than men (38 percent of male and 40 percent of female placements were made at that level). There was a substantial difference between men and women placed in employment, 25 versus 15 percent respectively. Of those placed, 9 percent of men went into self-employment, while 13 percent of women did. This difference was not researched, but the higher numbers of women in self-employment could reflect their domination of sewing and hairdressing placements, which result in a higher level of self-employment; more women are also placed in the commerce sector. Areas in which men are the majority support lower levels of self-employment.

## V. TRANSLATING POTENTIAL INTO SUCCESS

Based on the analysis of data collected in the field, AK seems to have potential to scale based upon: (1) high level of demand from both youth and employers; (2) compelling objective need for such a program given the high levels of un/underemployment, large and growing numbers of youth, lack of alternatives, and weak labor market institutions generally; (3) strong leadership and government partnership in place; and (5) evidence of success. Multiple challenges exist, including those related to the choice of AK model, which will affect the cost and level of capacity-building support needed for implementation, and the lack of existing capacity to either manage or implement the program with quality and fidelity at large scale. Overcoming barriers to youth participation in scaled programs will also be an important consideration.

Generally, donor funding is an element that must, especially in the short term, support the scaling effort of the AK model. All scaling scenarios recommended require a certain amount of donor funding, although some will potentially be self-sustaining in the long term. Fortunately, the AK model seems to appeal to many donors, filling a market niche with its unique variety of skills-building opportunities (e.g., life skills, financial literacy) and traditional vocational training. The program is also attractive to donors interested in supporting the most marginalized segments of society—a population often left behind by the formal TVET system due to cost and educational barriers. For donors prioritizing rural populations, the rural implementation of the AK model shows promise in preparing young people to work off-farm-jobs in agricultural value chains.

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<sup>52</sup> This is calculated as: self-employed + employed.

**Considering these factors, the following section discusses four potential options for scaling up AK. Scaling Up and Sustainability Scenarios.** These options are not necessarily mutually exclusive and could be blended depending upon the priorities of USAID/Rwanda and its GOR partners.

1. Scaling up through the **TVET system** currently operated by the WDA.
2. Scaling up in **urban areas**, including Kigali and other cities, by continuing to work with new or existing implementing partners (IPs).
3. Scaling up in **rural areas** through new IPs located in those areas.
4. Scaling up through **existing civil society institutions** (e.g. PSF, Itorero).
5. Scaling Up through **other government programs**.

In the rest of this section we discuss the first three options in detail, before turning to briefly consider the fourth and fifth. Table 9 describes each of the first three scenarios in terms of the AK model it would use; the strengths and weaknesses of the scenario; and the mechanisms that could be used to achieve scale.

**Table 9: Scaling Up and Sustainability Scenarios**

	<b>TVET</b>	<b>Urban</b>	<b>Rural</b>
<b>AK Model for Scale Up</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• WRC through TVET technical curricula</li> <li>• EDC AKMU to train teachers &amp; administrators on WRC</li> <li>• Books, manuals &amp; materials provided to TVET by donor or donation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• AK Urban Classic model (WRC, TT, internship, job placement)</li> <li>• IPs (social enterprises &amp; NGOs) operating in Kigali and eight other Rwandan cities</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• AK Rural SLG (WRC, IGA, SLG, job placement and follow up) &amp; AK ALP (same components plus ALP for literacy and numeracy)</li> <li>• IPs (social enterprises &amp; NGOs) in rural areas of 27 districts</li> </ul>
<b>Target Beneficiaries</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Secondary school graduates enrolled in TVET</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Primary &amp; secondary school graduates, possibly disadvantaged youth</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Poor, vulnerable, disadvantaged youth</li> </ul>
<b>Strengths</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Potential to leverage funding from other donors and GOR TVET expansion</li> <li>• Lowest cost to implement</li> <li>• Most financially sustainable</li> <li>• TVET system offers a progression of credentials and possibly better opportunities for employment</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Builds upon existing IP network</li> <li>• Builds private sector Technical Training sector</li> <li>• Can strengthen private sector linkages</li> <li>• Responds to demand for job placement &amp; follow up services</li> <li>• Can reach some underserved youth</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Ability to link with GOR and other donors' emphasis on agricultural value chains</li> <li>• Creates self-employment pathways</li> <li>• Can strengthen private sector linkages</li> <li>• Serves underserved youth</li> </ul>
<b>Weaknesses</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Does not serve the most disadvantaged students (in terms of educational attainment and SES)</li> <li>• TVET Technical training not always aligned with industry/employers' needs</li> <li>• Quality of WRC delivery at risk</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Theoretically based on fee for service financing structure, yet unproven</li> <li>• Need to search for alternative funding sources (e.g., other donors, grants)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Rural AK models have less evidence of success</li> <li>• Highest cost to implement</li> <li>• Focused mainly on micro-entrepreneurship, less environmental support for small businesses</li> </ul>
<b>Mechanisms to Achieve Scale</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• WRC training and coaching for TVET TOTs, teachers &amp; administration</li> <li>• Manage network of WRC implementers</li> <li>• Create additional partnerships</li> <li>• Accreditation &amp; quality control</li> <li>• Possible national youth employment opportunities database</li> <li>• Possible fee for service option on WRC training</li> <li>• Need for EDC AKMU and then AKO for accreditation &amp; quality control</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Capacity building for new and existing IPs</li> <li>• Support for diversifying and improving technical training areas</li> <li>• Possible national youth employment opportunities database</li> <li>• Accreditation &amp; quality control</li> <li>• Possible fee for service option on WRC training</li> <li>• Need for EDC AKMU and then AKO for accreditation &amp; quality control</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Need to leverage government and donor programs</li> <li>• Capacity-building training for new and existing IPs</li> <li>• Possible national youth employment opportunities database</li> <li>• Accreditation &amp; quality control</li> <li>• Need for EDC AKMU and then AKO for accreditation &amp; quality control</li> </ul>



## A. TVET SCENARIO

### THE AK MODEL FOR SCALE UP AND SUSTAINABILITY

In this scenario, AK would be scaled up by supporting the implementation of the new TVET technical curricula, which includes the WRC (in Level 3).<sup>53</sup> TOTs, teachers and administrators would be trained to teach and assess the WRC by the master trainers of EDC's AKMU, and would be provided with ongoing support until the WRC is correctly assimilated into curricula. The AKMU would not provide any financial support or sub-grants. It would provide books, manuals, and other materials (as necessary) at no cost or with a cost share for a certain period of time.

### EXPECTED LEVEL OF SCALE

Scaling up through the TVET system could occur, at least in principal, through either public or private institutions, or potentially both. There are several reasons to believe that scaling up through private TVET providers is not viable at this point. First, there is strong anecdotal evidence that the quality is at best highly uneven; private providers have not benefitted from any of the donor capacity building efforts in vocational education. Any scaling up through private providers would therefore have to conduct such a systematic review to identify viable partners. Second, private TVET providers do not have any centralized governance or management body, so that any future capacity building, monitoring and accreditation of these institutions would either have to be done by an independent AKMU, or eventually come under the WDA umbrella in a more structured way. Given the WDA's ambitious agenda for expanding and strengthening the public TVET schools is already well beyond its capacity, this is not feasible in the foreseeable future. Third, private TVET providers have not been involved in the restructuring of the TVET system, the changes to the qualification framework, or the introduction of competency-based, student oriented pedagogy and examination. They have not been engaged during the rollout of the new curricula that incorporates WRC. It does not appear that they will be monitored or supported by IPRCs once those are up and running in all provinces. At the time the fieldwork was carried out, the WDA was having difficulty in distributing the new curricula to all public TVET schools it is not clear if since then those curricula have been shared with any private TVET providers.

Scaling up of the WRC through the public TVET system has the greatest potential impact in terms of number of beneficiaries reached, integration into the GOR systems and sustainability; with the possibility of reaching all incoming public TVET students. Since the TVET system will be undergoing a process of capacity building and expansion,<sup>54</sup> the pace of WRC scale up would be tied to the expansion rate of the TVET system. Perhaps more importantly, public TVET institutions take special care to ensure the inclusion of for children of veterans, orphans (usually as a result of the genocide), and students with disabilities. An important point is that all TVET students must go through the first year curriculum, which is where AK's WRC would be integrated. Thus all TVET students would benefit, and this number would increase steadily over time with the growth and strengthening of the public TVET system.

### STRENGTHS OF THE TVET SCENARIO

A major strength of the public TVET scenario is funding, which would come from the GOR and other donors who are investing significantly in the TVET system. Belgian, Swiss, German, British, Japanese, and Korean bilateral donors are all heavily engaged, as are multilaterals and development banks including the Africa Development Bank and the World Bank. Moreover, a freeze on general budget support has redirected funding to sector or project support, which has benefitted the TVET system.

Another benefit of the TVET scale up is that it the implementer could help to develop the new Level 2, catch-up curriculum in the Rwanda TVET Qualification Framework (RTQF) (See Annex 6). Level 2

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53. The WRC was integrated into Level 3 of the TVET curriculum as the Belgium Technical Corporation was doing the redesign.

54. These changes include the implementation of the new curricula for Certificate I programs at vocational training centers, the rollout of a new student-centered, competency-based pedagogy, expansion of the number and capacity of Integrated Polytechnic Regional Centres, and an overall strengthening of the WDA and TVET system.

creates a space for a catch-up program that would allow disadvantaged students to come up to the S3 level, which is needed to enter a TVET program. The AKMU could develop, test, and integrate a “catch-up” year program based on the existing ALP curricula. Sustainability would be very high because the formal vocational training system is supported by the GOR and is part of the education system.

#### **WEAKNESSES OF THE TVET SCENARIO**

There are several trade-offs associated with scaling up through the TVET system. One is that, currently, TVET does not serve disadvantaged students such as those targeted by AK. This could be offset through the development of a new Level 2 curriculum in the qualifications framework that would allow those students with lower educational attainment to catch-up and meet the required S3 level to gain entry into Level 3 of the TVET system.

Another issue is cost: TVET services are not free. Both public and private schools charge school fees to students, but school fees in government schools are subsidized and therefore lower. Public TVET schools charge between 36,000 and 40,000 RF which is between \$58 and \$64 USD per student per term including boarding; while private TVET providers charge between RF80,000 and RF150,000, which means between \$129 and \$242 USD for the same services.<sup>55</sup>

An additional concern is that the TVET system tracks young men and women into vocations by gender. While the WDA has set out several objectives to address gender issues in the TVET system, it is not clear whether they include proactively encouraging young woman to move into non-traditional occupations.

TVET institutions do not currently provide much training in the sectors the GOR considers priorities. These organizations have at best a mixed record in aligning training with labor market needs (MINECOFIN, 2013). These weaknesses are, in part, the product of weak partnerships and relationships with the private sector.

Further, the TVET system has a number of structural weaknesses in terms of its budget, governance, accountability, and student support (MIFOTRA, 2012).<sup>56</sup> At one well-equipped TVET, staff reported that government transfers only account for 20 percent of their budget, with 40 percent coming from tuition and 40 percent from selling their products on the open market. TVET providers that do not have production facilities have lower budgets and, therefore, significantly lower quality infrastructure, equipment, and teachers. In addition, individual TVET institutions vary widely in the extent to which they provide internships, assistance with placement, and follow up for their graduates.

Finally, one major risk in going with the TVET scenario is that there could be pressure from the GOR to dramatically increase the number of students going through program, which would lead to an emphasis on quantity over quality. In general, the issues of capacity building and quality discussed in in Section IV above will have to be addressed.

#### **MECHANISMS TO ACHIEVE SCALE**

Scaling up through the TVET system offers the advantage of being able to build on a substantial foundation established by the current project. As noted above, AK leadership has participated in the sub-sector technical working group, developed an entrepreneurship module for the WDA, and already piloted WRC in TVET schools located in the Southern province. It has worked hard and successfully to get the WRC integrated into all of the 21 new vocational curricula. Future implementation would require extensive training of teachers and administration, combined with refresher courses and substantial follow up mentoring and coaching.

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55. Gaga and Musobo, 2012, p.49. In our interviews, we were told that at public TVET institutions tuition was RF 30,000 per term, without board, and RF200,000 for the year with board and other expenses. Other expenses include books and office supplies, uniforms, and materials for training.

56. The Human Capital and Skills Strategy lists eight historical weaknesses of the TVET system (MIFOTRA, 2012, p. 74).

In light of the need for capacity building and quality control during AK scale up, there will be a continuing role for the EDC AKMU. Likely activities will be managing the network of those implementing WRC; building the capacity of implementers to create partnerships with other actors, especially at the national level and advocate for improving the enabling environment for youth livelihood opportunities; and providing accreditation and quality review of programming.

## B. URBAN SCENARIO

### THE AK MODEL FOR SCALE UP AND SUSTAINABILITY

In the Urban scale up scenario, the AK Urban Classic model would be used. This model includes the WRC, TT, internships, and job placement and follow-up assistance. The principal beneficiaries would be primary and secondary school graduates living in urban areas of Rwanda. The program could also potentially reach disadvantaged urban youth. The model would be delivered by new or existing IPs using either grant funding from other donors or a fee for service structure.

Scaling up would start by building on the foundation of the existing AK project. The EDC AKMU would select existing IPs in Kigali that have the strongest implementation strategies and financial situations (including potential access to future funding sources). The program would simultaneously expand to major cities outside of Kigali by selecting new IPs. The selection criteria currently used by AK could be adapted for this purpose.

### EXPECTED LEVEL OF SCALE

In the Urban scenario, the expected level of scale per year would be approximately 5,000 students in Kigali (around 300–400 for each of 15 IPs), and around 2,500 outside of Kigali after the program is up and running.<sup>57</sup> (See Table 10.) This is based on the AKMU identifying and supporting 14 sustainable IPs in the eight other cities of Rwanda. Thus the total target for scaling up in the Urban scenario would be 29 IPs and 7,500 students annually.

**Table 10: Proposed Cities for the Urban Scenario**

City Name	Estimated Population	Province	Proposed Number of IPs
<i>Butare</i>	89,600	Southern	2
<i>Gitarama</i>	87,613	Southern	2
<i>Musanze</i>	86,685	Northern	2
<i>Gisenyi</i>	83,623	Western	2
<i>Byumba</i>	70,593	Northern	2
<i>Kibuye</i>	48,024	Western	1
<i>Rwanagana</i>	47,203	Eastern	2*
<i>Kibungo</i>	46,240	Eastern	1
<b>TOTAL</b>			14

Note: There would be two IPs in this city to serve as a hub for the Eastern Province.

### STRENGTHS OF THE URBAN SCENARIO

The Urban scenario has several important strengths. First, urbanization has been proceeding steadily in Rwanda and is expected to continue. As rural youth continue to migrate to the cities, this scale-up scenario could reach an important and currently underserved market. Urban areas are also where the most employment is available--especially formal employment opportunities.

57. At this time the expectation is that it will take five years to be at full operational capacity. This is based on the following calculations: two years of capacity building to for the existing Kigali IPs to become potentially self-sustaining; one year to identify and negotiate agreements with 14 new non-Kigali IPs; two years for non-Kigali IPs to become competent in delivering AK; and two additional years for the non-Kigali IPs to increase their capacity to roughly 175 students per IP and to become self-sustaining.

Additionally, this scenario enables the currently existing IPs in Kigali to become more organizationally and financially independent and is much more likely to be financially sustainable. This would essentially make AK's huge investment in building IP capacity sustainable. Financial independence could occur through income earned by fee-for-service training of youth; several IPs are already experimenting with charging roughly \$50 for just a WRC course and believe they could charge \$100 or more for a combination of IP and technical training. While the latter would not cover all of the costs of delivering these services, many IPs are able to supplement fees with other income, grants, donation and contracts.

Now that programs are firmly entrenched in government agencies like the RDB, IPs might be able to negotiate contracts to deliver this training. The same is likely to be true with those well-paid, formal sector partners like Nakumatt and 3-4 star hotels that have become accustomed to the quality of AK graduates. Depending on local market conditions, the new IPs in other major cities could—with some support—also become financially and organizationally self-sufficient.

Another advantage of the Urban scenario is that it creates a civil society alternative to government provision of AK through TVET institutions. While formal public education has played an important role in Rwanda and that role is likely to increase, having a civil society alternative would provide an important benchmark against which TVET services could be measured. Additionally, it would offer competition to the TVET program and provide access to those unable to enter the TVET system.

Scaling up the Urban scenario would also begin to more fully fill the gaps for job placement and follow-up. There is a strong and growing need for private sector and civil society job placement services, especially for low-skilled, low-educated workers. Employers interviewed were quite explicit in saying that they would welcome a private or NGO presence in their sector that could provide them with AK-certified, qualified workers.

#### **WEAKNESSES OF THE URBAN SCENARIO**

The weakness of the Urban scenario will depend on what mix of sustainable income sources IPs end up with after several years of experience. If they are able to generate the majority of their income from grants or contracts with the government, donors and the private sector, then fees will be low and/or they will be able to offer free or low-cost service to vulnerable youth. If grant and contract income is not sufficient, then they will end up being a largely fee-for-service system, meaning that their primary clientele would be those youth with the capacity to pay.

Depending on demand and willingness to pay, it might be possible to mitigate these effects on who can participate by exploring pricing models that would allow for cross-subsidies and/or scholarship funding. This would also allow the program to provide some services to poor and disadvantaged youth, which could then be supplemented by funding from the government and other donors. IPs would also need to be provided with the management capacity to take advantage of alternative funding opportunities that may exist. The viability of the Urban scenario requires more market research on demand and ability-to-pay that was beyond the scope of work for this paper, and should be a first priority for any new program that considers pursuing.

#### **MECHANISMS TO ACHIEVE SCALE**

Considering the capacity building required for this scenario, there would again be a high need for maintaining the role of the EDC AKMU to help IPs conduct market analysis; cultivate relationships with private enterprises; manage finances; provide career counseling and coaching for students; conduct outreach and advertising; and provide job placement and follow-up support for graduates. The AKMU would also need to help the IPs diversify the sector training that they provide to students—so they would have a greater choice of technical training after the WRC.

The AKMU could facilitate the development of a national youth employment opportunities database by the private or public sector, or as a public-private partnership. That said, it appears that YEGO centers have job information systems youth can access. This would allow for more job placement opportunities

for youth. The SMS job matching portal that is already operating could be scaled up to reach a larger number of youth.

If there were to be a transition from the EDC AKMU to a non-profit organization (Akazi Kanoze Organization), the transition would happen with the AKMU steadily decreasing its financial support through sub-grants until there was no funding left. The Akazi Kanoze Organization (AKO) would then need to be financially self-sufficient with revenues collected as fees for services. The AKO could also set up a membership structure whereby organizations implementing the AK model would join a network.<sup>58</sup> The existence of the network would help support the AKO financially and would also provide a platform for those implementing the AK model to share information and best practices.

## **C. RURAL SCENARIO**

### **THE AK MODEL FOR SCALE UP AND SUSTAINABILITY**

Two versions of the AK model would be scaled up in the Rural scenario. The first would be the AK rural savings and lending group (SLG) model in which IPs would recruit youth participants from the same communities to form SLGs, which would help them to accumulate savings so they could start or maintain a business. This program would include the WRC, entrepreneurship training, and in some cases, technical training. The second model would include all of these same components, with the addition of the ALP at the beginning in order to bring some youth to a higher level of literacy and numeracy skills. In both models, youth participants would be supported in starting their own cooperatives, creating self-employment, or finding outside employment.

The principal beneficiaries of the Rural scenario would be poor, vulnerable, or disadvantaged rural youth with a P4 education or higher. While students with some secondary school education or a degree could also be included, the program might decide that this group is a lesser priority because it would likely be able to find a place in the revised TVET system.

The two models would be delivered by IPs located in peri-urban and rural areas, and funding for the program would come entirely from USAID and/or other donors. Some of this funding could be leveraged with other financial resources available to IPs. The scale up could be rolled out by targeting receptive districts first.

### **EXPECTED LEVEL OF SCALE**

It is expected that by the end of the scale up effort under the Rural Scenario, AK would be reaching 3,900 youth nationally per year – with approximately 1,500 of these youth completing the version of the program that includes the ALP. This would represent a minimum of roughly 150 students per year for four years in each of Rwanda's 27 districts outside of Kigali. To achieve these numbers, the EDC AKMU would need to identify and support at least one rural IP in each rural district. It is recommended that this be a phased process that starts in those districts where local governments are most receptive and supportive of implementing the AK model; where there are strong possibilities for linkages with value chains; and where there are other relevant donor programs that can help build leverage.

### **STRENGTHS OF THE RURAL SCENARIO**

The ability to link with agricultural value chains is a major strength of the rural scenario, given that creating non-farm rural employment is a major GOR priority (MINECOFIN, 2013). Donor programs are also targeting these value chains, so there would likely be a good opportunity for leveraging employment activities in these rural areas. The strong track record of AK in creating linkages with private enterprises would be a benefit.

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58. The following would need to be determined: (a) exactly what services beyond accreditation network members would receive; (b) which of those services would be part of their AK network membership dues, and what would be fee for service; and (c) whether and to what extent the AKO would compete with IPs in providing training to employers, government agencies, etc.

Another advantage of the Rural scenario is that it would likely serve poor, disadvantaged youth who might not receive services otherwise. It has the potential to leave an important legacy in rural areas because of its expected impact on IPs, trainers, local youth, and their communities. By creating a presence in those areas, AK may also be able to create ongoing demand for WRC training within Youth Employment for Global Opportunity Centers (YEGOs) or the formal education system.

#### **WEAKNESSES OF THE RURAL SCENARIO**

The principal weakness of the Rural scenario is that it is difficult to see how it is financially sustainable. Because of the various costs incurred in supporting a more dispersed, poorer and less educated population it would be more expensive per participant. At the same time, in rural areas there are few if any formal sector employers or employer federations willing to pay for training to supplement IPs earnings. Given the GOR's heavy aid dependence, it is difficult to imagine the national government absorbing the cost and local governments also have limited resources. Thus a rural IP program would be dependent on donor financing at least until Rwanda achieves middle-income status or is able to generate more internal revenues.

Another weakness of the Rural scenario is that the Rural SLG and ALP models are relatively unproven compared to other AK models because they have been operational for less time. While savings and lending groups have been around in Rwanda and elsewhere for years, there is not yet any evidence that either adding WRC or remedial literacy and numeracy (e.g., ALP) to SLG programs increases their impact on livelihoods creation or employment. There have been approximately 300 graduates of the Rural SLG, and only a single IP has been implemented. For the ALP model, seven IPs have provided services to 700 graduates.

It is also much more expensive to deliver AK in rural areas because of greater distances and lower population density. As a result, any training and capacity-building efforts often involve paying for transportation and lodging. Seeing as this option would need to be completely funded by USAID or other donors, it could be a very difficult model to support.

Additionally, there is a general lack of employment, especially formal employment, in rural areas. Thus the Rural scenario relies much more on self-employment, income generating activities (IGAs), and creation of small businesses or rural cooperatives to generate positive employment outcomes. While the GOR is taking action to support small businesses, it is unclear how successful they will be in creating a more supportive enabling environment. More evaluation is needed into whether AK leads to sustained self-employment outcomes.

Given that micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs) or rural cooperatives face a number of obstacles, particularly in terms of access to start-up capital and credit, generating livelihood opportunities may be difficult. It is also unclear whether MSMEs and rural cooperatives will attract youth since several AK beneficiaries who were interviewed said they prefer to work alone. To mitigate this issue, greater resources would need to be devoted to advocacy, outreach, public relations, and coalition building than has been done by AK to date.

#### **MECHANISMS TO ACHIEVE SCALE**

In this scenario, there would need to be a particular emphasis on linking the AK Rural models to value chains. USAID itself, the UN-based International Fund for Agricultural Development,<sup>59</sup> and other bilateral and multilateral donors have supported programs to either create new agricultural value chains, expand existing ones or both. These programs create jobs, though with specific technical requirements, so that any linkage between a rural version of AK and value chain programs would need to coordinate

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59. We refer here to IFAD's Rural Small and Micro Enterprise Promotion Project (PPPMER), which has gone through two phases. The second phase, PPPMER II was a nine year program valued at \$18.2 million. It was implemented through MINICOM whose aim was to reduce rural poverty through the development of rural off-farm small and micro enterprises. The specific value chains targeted by PPPMER were Handicrafts and Tailoring. See IFAD, Republic of Rwanda: Rural Small and Micro Enterprise Promotion Project – Phase II (PPPMER II) follow up report: [http://operations.ifad.org/web/ifad/operations/country/project/tags/rwanda/1550/project\\_overview](http://operations.ifad.org/web/ifad/operations/country/project/tags/rwanda/1550/project_overview)

closely in terms of the technical training required. AK has already partnered with one IP that is working with the coffee value chain in Western Rwanda, and interviews with its management indicate that the training program is highly successful.

It would again be necessary for a coordinating body like the EDC AKMU to work with IPs in leveraging government and donor programs that work with agricultural value chains, especially USAID programs. IPs would also need specific training in helping youth to take jobs in existing firms working in the value chain or to create small businesses in missing niches in the value chain. Some examples of this might be to create businesses that supply inputs upstream or work downstream in post-harvest collection, processing, and marketing.

Capacity building for IPs under the Rural scenario would be similar to what has been done by AK to date. This would involve the EDC AKMU staff supporting IPs with an RFA process, training them to deliver the WRC, improving their financial management skills, and helping them set up evaluation systems—all of which would likely take at least two years. In the long term, if a non-profit AKO were established, the same fee-for-service or membership-funding structure could be developed.

#### **D. SCALING UP THROUGH OTHER GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS**

One of the major challenges for youth trying to find employment in Rwanda has been the lack of institutions that provide career planning and placement or job search assistance. To address these issues the GOR is establishing a set of services aimed at supporting job seekers and young entrepreneurs.<sup>60</sup> These services will be implemented through the RDB's Business Development Centers (BDCs), the MYICT's Youth Employment for Global Opportunities centers, and other initiatives with similar capacity and capabilities (MINECOFIN, 2013). The WDA is working with MYICT to link the YEGO program to TVET providers and integrate the YEGO centers into the TVET system (Nzigira, 2012). AK is already being offered to 400 of the participants in the RDB's internship program. All of these currently operating programs provide a possible mechanism for scaling up AK components.

Another potential pathway for scale up is through Itorero. As discussed previously, Itorero is a youth organization that mobilizes various social sectors to support Rwandan society and development. Youth are strongly encouraged to participate in its National Service program, and many youth see membership as a necessity for advancement in the highly politicized Rwandan political economy. The organization's Chairman expressed interest in complementing Itorero's training with the AK WRC so that the young people enrolled could learn important life skills. With access to huge numbers of youth and a focus on employability and entrepreneurship, Itorero could provide another avenue for scaling.

#### **THE AK MODEL FOR SCALE UP AND SUSTAINABILITY**

Most of these mechanisms have very limited internal training capacity, management, infrastructure, or equipment. BDCs have been contracted out to various private providers, depending on the province. Technical training would not be possible at RDB and is unlikely to be viable at BDCs, with the possible exception of vocations which only require classroom training (e.g. accounting, or computers). BDCs are starting to offer entrepreneurship training, and there is a possibility to combine WRC with that program. It is unclear what facilities YEGOs will have and what the training capacity of Itorero is currently. Given these limitations, the AK model would likely be confined to WRC only.

#### **EXPECTED LEVEL OF SCALE**

It is difficult to assess the ultimate potential of this mechanism for scaling. The RDB is quite limited, as its internship program probably has a maximum of 1,200 students, and these are mostly university graduates. As BDCs have been privatized, they operate on a fee-for-service basis and are demand-driven. It is impossible to say how many youth would participate in WRC classes at a BDC, as BDCs are not confined to youth and in fact target anyone who is a potential or actual SME owner or startup. There is one BDC in each of the 30 districts, and the pilot entrepreneurship program is expected to

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60. Private sector services in these areas do not yet exist.

have three cohorts of 40-50 students per year. Should this program spread to all 30 districts, 4,500 participants (not only youth) are possible.

YEGO centers are even newer than BDCs and as of spring 2013 there were only a few in operation. There are projected to be 30, one in each district, by the end of 2013 and ultimately one in each sector (n=416) by the end of 2018. The potential scale for AK being implemented through YEGO centers is ultimately quite large, in the tens of thousands annually, assuming that the ultimate number is in line with current government plans. Unlike BDCs, YEGO centers target youth. Itorero also has significant reach in terms of the number of youth who might potentially participate, especially if AK was made a mandatory part of the National Service component.

#### **STRENGTHS OF THE OTHER GOVERNMENT SCENARIO**

The major strength of this scenario is its ability to leverage new infrastructure and delivery mechanisms, ones that will ultimately have a presence in all districts. In addition, an association with the RDB would be helpful as it is one of the strongest and most powerful government institutions. Given RDBs leading role in promoting private sector development in Rwanda, integration of AK into RDB institutions and programming would fully legitimate the program and likely mainstream it into business and entrepreneurship training. This option would be sustainable, at least politically and institutionally.

Perhaps the greatest upside for scaling in this scenario is through YEGOs and Itorero. YEGOs will ultimately have the largest geographical reach, they already target youth, and are planning to deliver a variety of training and other services with clear synergies for WRC and other AK components. Itorero, like the RDB, is a very important and highly visible institution politically, with leadership from the President. Integration into Itorero would provide tremendous legitimacy for AK.

#### **WEAKNESSES OF THE OTHER GOVERNMENT SCENARIO**

The principal weakness of this scenario is that its viability is highly uncertain and risky, with the exception of the small RDB internship program. The internship program is not of sufficient size to warrant a follow-up program. BDCs are brand new and the quality of delivery, especially of training and diversity of services available, has yet to be demonstrated. It is also not clear whether the fee-for-service private delivery model is sustainable or effective in promoting SMEs. As management has been contracted to private companies, it does not appear that they have the incentives, organizational culture and orientation to deliver WRC with the student-oriented, experiential and participatory pedagogical approach that is needed for it to be effective. Also, BDCs do not target vulnerable populations or youth, and given their complete reliance on fee-for-service, it is unlikely that they would attract much of either group.

YEGOs have the most potential, but as of this writing they mostly only exist on paper, especially compared with the large number of public TVET providers and the potential to convert other types of schools into TVET institutions. The MINYICT is much weaker politically and fiscally than the RDB, and has less existing management or implementation capacity than the MINEDUC and WDA, especially in terms of designing and implementing curricula. It might make sense, or even be necessary, to wait until these organizations are established and up and running before working through them, depending on the pace of establishment and capacity building. Perhaps most importantly, it is not clear whether YEGOs will have their own training staff (and funding for training) or only serve as a centralized location and convening body to organize trainings provided by other institutions. If the former, then some other organization would need to be found and/or capacitated in each district/sector that could deliver AK in the YEGO context.

Like the Rural scenario, both a strength and weakness of this scenario is that BDCs, YEGOs and Itorero are spread out over the country. This makes capacity building expensive if it involves working on the ground with each BDC/YEGO, which is one reason that the RDB contracted to a different provider in each province (whereas the MINYICT already has a geographically diversified presence). It was beyond



the resources available for this study to do an assessment of Itorero's reach and capacity, and if scaling up through that organization is to be considered seriously, that is clearly a first step.

### **MECHANISMS TO ACHIEVE SCALE**

There are three possible mechanisms for scaling in this scenario. One would be similar to the Rural scenario, except instead of an AKMU working with IPs, it would work directly with BDCs and YEGOs. This assumes that local BDCs and YEGOs would have their own training capacity and funding. Like the Rural scenario, this requires a significant physical presence on the ground – it would be difficult to do based only in Kigali – and thus would be expensive.

The second alternative would be to employ a cascade trainer-of-trainers approach, by creating capacity to train and coach AK within the four private contractors running BDC and in the MINYICT. Currently the WDA and TVET system do not have this kind of capacity and rely on hired external trainers, so there must be a healthy skepticism regarding the viability of this alternative.

Finally, and perhaps the most viable, would be to pair BDCs and YEGOs with nearby, local IPs that would provide the AK training in BDC and YEGO facilities. This has the advantage of addressing the lack of capacity in YEGOs, if not also BDCs, but effectively means that implementation of this scenario requires combining it with the Rural scenario.

## **E. SCALING UP THROUGH THE PRIVATE SECTOR**

Based on the information collected by the assessment team, there seem to be no private training or labor market service providers in Rwanda that could be potential implementers of AK other than the existing small, social enterprises that EDC has already included as IPs. In this environment scaling up of AK would have to take place through peak business organizations like the Private Sector Federation (PSF) or its individual chambers. The PSF includes members from all the major sectors of the Rwandan economy (e.g., agriculture and tourism), and is the primary vehicle for giving the private sector a voice. As the WRC provides youth with broad and transferable skills, it may be a good fit for the PSF's diverse membership. While it lacks sufficient political independence, the PSF is restructuring to better serve private sector interests and implementing some innovative initiatives. To be more responsive to private sector needs, the PSF is moving towards direct membership in lieu of representation through PSF chambers.<sup>61</sup> In addition, PSF is collaborating with the RDB to create a common communication platform so that it can channel and advocate for private sector concerns with decision makers in the GOR. This is called the PPD platform, the Secretariat of which is hosted at the RDB. The PSF is also expanding its reach; traditionally focused on Kigali, it has now expanded into all of Rwanda's five provinces and 30 districts.

Programming that has a direct impact on the potential employment of young people in the private sector is also a priority for the PSF. For example, the partially PSF-funded kLab technology hub has established an "open space for IT entrepreneurs" in downtown Kigali.<sup>62</sup> Youth from across the country, predominantly university graduates, have the opportunity to submit ICT-focused business plans (mostly web applications) for management review. The young people that are accepted into kLab have access to a creative space with computers and free Wi-Fi, networking/collaboration opportunities with like-minded young people, mentorship opportunities, and a host of different classes (e.g., business idea development, web interfaces and the user experience, and market feasibility). While this population is not the original target of AK, the WRC has been shown to be valuable to students of all education levels. kLab's manager showed interest in potentially adding the WRC to the menu of training options. While mainstreaming into PSF activities might be years away, a more robust PSF with greater implementation power has the potential to be a good avenue for scaling the WRC.

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61. This is based on interviews with bilateral donors who requested anonymity given the sensitive nature of the subject.

62. Personal communication, February 25, 2013.

## THE AK MODEL FOR SCALE UP AND SUSTAINABILITY

The PSF or its chambers should be able to deliver, or contract for the delivery, of some version of the Urban AK model (i.e., WRC and technical training). Given their membership, they should be well placed to provide internships and would be a good vehicle for organizing a volunteer corps for coaching and mentoring. It is doubtful whether they have either the interest or capability to deliver any form of micro-finance like SLG or remedial learning like ALP. On the other hand, they should favor integrating entrepreneurship programming.

## EXPECTED LEVEL OF SCALE

It is difficult to know what kind of scale working with and through the PSF could potentially achieve. There are 282,000 employees in the formally registered enterprises that comprise the PSF (out of a population well over 11 million) and over half of these are in either wholesale/retail trade or accommodation and food services. It was beyond the scope of this study to assess the Rwandan labor market and annual turnover rates and the age of new hires in particular. However even optimistic assumptions of 10 percent of existing employment would suggest that potential training and employment for youth would be at best around 30,000. On the other hand, the potential for scaling of AK to existing employees, at least of medium and large enterprises, could be up to 70,000 (See Table 11).

**Table 11: Number of enterprises by size and province**

Province	Size of establishment (Number of employees)				Total
	Micro (1-3)	Small (4-30)	Med (31-100)	Large (101+)	
Kigali City	34,306	25,445	10,079	12,645	<b>82,475</b>
Northern	27,026	9,712	3,361	8,759	<b>48,858</b>
Eastern	26,405	8,201	1,901	915	<b>37,422</b>
Southern	27,416	12,847	5,833	4,896	<b>50,992</b>
Western	29,397	11,519	3,439	17,844	<b>62,199</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>144,550</b>	<b>67,724</b>	<b>24,613</b>	<b>45,059</b>	<b>281,946</b>
<b>Percent of all enterprises</b>	(51.3%)	(24.0%)	(8.7%)	(16.0%)	

Source: Rwanda, Ministry of Commerce and others, 2011 Establishment Census, Table 5.4.

## STRENGTHS OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR SCENARIO

The primary strength of this scenario is capacity to pay. While there was no explicit discussion with the PSF leadership of this issue, it was made clear that they already do fund some training and that some individual enterprises already pay for on-boarding and in-service training. The private sector scenario could provide an effective complement to the Urban scenario, in that it would help create demand for the services of IPs. Given that the PSF and its member have less presence in the rural areas, pairing it with the Rural scenario is a less viable option.

## WEAKNESSES OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR SCENARIO

This scenario has three major weaknesses - the first is that the PSF itself, and its members, have no capacity to either manage or deliver AK training themselves. The PSF has a tiny staff, so even if training were fully contracted out, it is questionable how much contracting and oversight capacity is held by the PSF and its chambers. Second, while the PSF leadership seems eager and supportive to be part of the GOR's efforts to improve the quality of the labor force and youth employment, it is unclear how much actual support there is for this in the membership. Of the PSF's ten chambers only a few are really active and functioning, and interviews with business owners illuminated membership as an obligation rather than as representation of their interests. Finally, it is hard to imagine that most Rwandan formal sector enterprises are willing to pro-actively train and hire vulnerable youth with low formal educational attainment, who are a part of AK's target population. Formal employment in Rwanda is highly

concentrated in Kigali (roughly half)<sup>63</sup>, and in urban areas more generally. It would appear that this scenario is not a viable mechanism for reaching rural youth.

#### **MECHANISMS TO PRIVATE SECTOR SCALE**

Given that the PSF itself has little training capacity and limited management capacity, training would have to be done through contract to external providers. This means that the Private Sector scenario would have to be paired with capacity building of external providers (e.g. AK IPs), whether existing NGOs and social enterprises, or others. As suggested above, it makes the most sense to combine this with the Urban scenario, given that existing AK IPs are concentrated there, as is formal employment.

### **F. SCALE-UP RECOMMENDATIONS**

This section provides a discussion of all scenarios based on the advantages and disadvantages presented. Recommendations are made for continuing a central organizing implementation unit, as well as for choosing a scaling up strategy.

#### **CENTRAL ORGANIZING MANAGEMENT UNIT**

A common thread under the three main scenarios (TVET, Urban, Rural) is the need to continue the EDC AKMU or some kind of project management and implementation unit. In both the Urban and Rural scenarios, this unit would handle the basic function of selecting IPs; in the Rural scenario, it would also need to provide grants management. In all three scenarios, the AKMU would conduct training and capacity-building activities such as:

- Training WRC teachers;
- Mentoring and coaching for WRC teachers;
- Managing the network of WRC implementers;
- Creating partnerships with other actors, especially at the national level;
- Advocating for improvement in the enabling environment for youth livelihood opportunities;
- Conducting market analysis
- Cultivating relationships with private enterprises; and
- Helping IPs to diversify sector training provided to students.

It is recommended that the AKMU set up a formal AK accreditation system and provide overall quality control during scale up and beyond. Deterioration of quality is one of the most common ways that scaling-up efforts fail to achieve their objectives.

Once USAID funding of AK has ended, it is recommended that an organization (e.g., the Akazi Kanoze Organization) be developed to carry on with these types of activities. The AKO would then need to be financially self-sufficient with revenues collected as fees for services, including accreditation. The AKO could also set up a structure whereby organizations implementing the AK model would join a network and pay a membership fee. The incentive for members to maintain their accreditation and/or membership in the network would likely depend heavily on the value of the AK brand and its association in the minds of employers and youth with quality. To achieve and sustain this, the AKO must prioritize creating a reputation for quality and communicating that success through media and advertising.

#### **SCENARIO RECOMMENDATIONS**

Based on the analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of each of the three scenarios presented, the TVET scenario has the strongest case for scaling up. Because it leverages the existing training capacity, equipment and infrastructure of the TVET system, it is likely to have the lowest long-term unit costs. It is clearly sustainable, both financially and organizationally, given that it is grafting WRC onto an existing GOR delivery mechanism. Assuming the GOR is even somewhat successful in achieving its goals for

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63. Rwanda Ministry of Commerce (2011). Establishment Census, Figure 9.3, p. 57 shows that 45.7 percent of formal sector employment was in Kigali, and in multiple interviews strongly suggest that that number has risen since 2011. The Southern, Eastern, Western and Northern provinces had 16.9, 14.4, 13.3 and 9.8 percent, respectively.

TVET enrollment, it has the potential to reach the largest number of youth. It builds on the current integration of the WRC into 21 of the new TVET curricula, and leverages the huge and ongoing financial investment being made by multiple donors in the TVET system. This is truly a unique occasion of a perfect scaling up opportunity with alignment in policy, programming, capacity building, funding, key stakeholders, and even the commitment to a changed pedagogy.

The Urban and Rural scenarios are almost mirror images. The advantages of the Urban scenario are that it (1) builds on proven success, (2) leverages the substantial investment in Kigali-based IPs, (3) fills a key niche in the labor market, (4) provides a complementary civil society alternative, and (5) has a very good chance of being organizationally and financially sustainable. On the downside, it targets more educated youth with greater capacity to pay.

The Rural scenario is the converse in that it (1) is less proven, (2) has a much lower chance of either financial or organizational sustainability, and (3) may have more modest outcomes given the lack of formal employment in rural areas. Its great strengths are that it will deliver services to areas and populations that most need them.

The two additional scenarios - Other Government and Private Sector - both have merit, but not as standalone activities. They require creation of external service providers that can deliver AK with quality and fidelity; these do not currently exist, despite the successes of AK in building capacity in IPs. The probability of sustainability for both scenarios would be greatly increased if an AKMU/AKO existed and was itself sustainable; this would require investing in the Urban or Rural scenarios. Pairing Other Government with the Rural scenario makes sense, given that both YEGOs and BDCs will have a presence throughout Rwanda. For the Private Sector option, pairing it with the Urban scenario is recommended.

If resources were no obstacle, scaling up all three main scenarios would be recommended. If all three scenarios are not affordable, it is strongly recommended that at least two be funded because of the huge synergies and economies of scope of having a central organizing implementation unit like the AKMU.

Pending an evaluation of its effectiveness and impact, there could be a case to be made for the Rural scenario, preferably combined with Other Government option. However the greatest scale and synergies are between the TVET, Urban, and Private Sector scenarios in that they would benefit from several activities of the AKMU including the creation of a network, an accreditation system, and a job placement database and service.

## **YOUTH ASSOCIATIONS**

While the assessment team investigated the possibility of scaling up AK using existing youth organizations (other than Itorero, which is quasi-governmental), very few potentially viable youth organizations were discovered. One possibility was the Rwandan National Youth Council (RNYC). The RNYC is a constitutionally-mandated independent government entity with a mission to facilitate youth participation in socio-economic development and transformation. One of the main functions of the RNYC is to monitor and support youth organizations (e.g., cooperatives, CSOs, religious and university-based organizations), that provide training in entrepreneurship, job creation, leadership, and civic involvement. During an interview, the executive director shared that he sees value in the WRC, believes that AK's goals are aligned the RNYC's, and expressed interest in collaborating with AK.

One RNYC member, the Association des Etudiants Et Éléves Rescapés Du Genocide (AERG), which provides services to students who are genocide survivors, is currently an AK non-sub grantee partner. AERG delivers the WRC, ICT training, entrepreneurship training, English literacy lessons, mentoring, and provides financing to promising projects. EDC provides AERG with some support, but no grant funding; thus all AERG WRC trainers are volunteers. The Entrepreneurship Program Coordinator stated during an interview that he would like to continue the WRC component, but needs to find funding for trainers. While AERG is only delivering AK to a small number of youth, it does have scaling potential with 43,000 active members.

## **VI. GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SCALING UP LIVELIHOOD TRAINING PROGRAMS**

### **1. EVALUATE MULTIPLE MODELS OF YOUTH LIVELIHOODS PROGRAMS**

EDC has implemented the AK project using different combinations of program components. It is a common mistake in scaling up, to think that “one size fits all.” Even in a relatively homogenous country like Rwanda the AK experience showed that one model could not meet the needs of both urban and rural populations, youth of low and high educational attainment, or areas with and without formal employment opportunities. Generating experience with multiple variations of the model during the first phase of the project allowed for more informed decision making in scaling up, as well as the establishment of the model’s external validity. It increased the evidence base for making an informed judgment as to how many versions of the model were necessary to meet the needs of different types of beneficiaries.

AK leadership recognized early on that the WDA, like most GOR agencies, needed quick wins and evidence. With its rapid implementation of WRC, AK was able to share positive results to show the project was achieving GOR goals. They also recognized that framing AK outcomes in terms GOR recognized would be most effective. Communications and particularly language were important; initial approaches using terms like work readiness or soft skills didn’t gain much of an audience. However once AK learned to repackage and rebrand its program in line with the same phrases being used by the President and other senior leaders, they got traction. They made it clear that the WRC taught customer service, leadership, communication, entrepreneurship, good work habits, and financial management skills.

It is important to note that substantial resources were invested in creating all of the necessary relationships and partnerships as well as in training, building capacity, and monitoring multiple delivery mechanisms. With less experimentation and variety, AK would have been able to focus on one or two mechanisms and invest more heavily in building their capacity and increasing the prospects for institutional sustainability. In creating the foundations for scaling up, there are likely tradeoffs between depth and breadth of experience, creating capacity, evaluation, and the ownership and buy-in among diverse stakeholders.

In terms of transferring this lesson to other USAID programs, in contexts where delivery capacity is limited, , there are key differences in income and education levels among defined segments of the population, and anticipated/ultimate scale will cover a large percentage of rural and urban populations, it might be necessary to test a few approaches in order to find the best fit for different population groups.

### **2. CREATE MULTIPLE PROGRAM PATHWAYS**

A major strength of AK is the fact that the model has been delivered through multiple pathways. There are several advantages to this for scaling up. First, it is unlikely that at scale any one system or delivery mechanism, even the government, is capable of reaching all types of potential beneficiaries with need or locations. In the case of AK, the TVET system, even when it is fully expanded, will not likely serve youth who have dropped out of school. This observation is reinforced by the fact that different versions of the model often require different organizational capabilities. In the case of AK, specialized organizations existed –rural social enterprises – that were able to link into existing agricultural value chains; whereas in urban areas, social enterprises specializing in information technology were required to deliver training in that area. No one organization or delivery mechanism is likely to be able deliver all versions of the model to all beneficiaries types. Finally, alternative delivery mechanisms can and usually do imply differential costs, requiring alternative funding sources.

The principal drivers of the diversity of pathways used by AK in Rwanda were the target numbers and types of beneficiaries. Those targets couldn’t be achieved through just one delivery mechanism or location. EDC couldn’t reach 150,000 youth, especially vulnerable youth, only by working with IPs in

Kigali. While the formal TVET system was in principal capable of reaching that scale, only a small percentage of TVET students would be considered vulnerable - and reaching a certain percentage of vulnerable youth was an explicit target result.

It is important to note in applying this lesson to other programs and countries, not all will need multiple pathways to achieve scale. The need for multiple delivery mechanisms depends on several factors, including how innovative the program is relative to existing programs. A program that can work with existing approaches, incentives and organizational culture is also more easily and successfully adopted.

In many low capacity countries, the public sector is the first choice of delivery mechanisms because it usually has existing capacity to deliver at relatively large scale, allowing for lower costs by leveraging existing systems, infrastructure and human resources. The public sector is also often constitutionally mandated to address the issue in question. At the same time, however, the public sector frequently delivers low quality due to weak management, limited resources, misaligned incentives, and lack of effective accountability and governance.

For AK, the WDA and its TVET system illustrate many of these lessons. The WDA's adoption of WRC into its own curricula provided critical legitimacy for the program and allowed EDC to leverage this into official sanction and approval of AK graduates. Grafting AK onto the TVET system's resources did allow for AK to be delivered at much lower costs to EDC and this is likely to be even more the case for future scaling as the TVET system grows. The Rwandan TVET system also illustrates the limited reach of the public system and the issues of quality. Public TVET schools mostly reach students above a certain educational attainment and with certain financial means. This is likely to be true in most countries where certain populations are not reached by formal systems. Additionally, While there is still need to continue build WDA capacity, senior management staff is very capable and accountability systems are developing. Until this is no longer the case, ensuring the quality of AK within the system will require an intermediary to provide training, capacity building, and quality assurance.

### **3. APPRECIATE THE IMPORTANCE OF PARTNERSHIPS**

The experience of AK illustrates the vital importance of partnerships. The AKMU established several successful partnerships with different types of stakeholders who contributed value to the effort. The political support of MIFOTRA was important for obtaining the buy-in of the RDB, and beneficiaries (among others). The RDB recognized the importance of the AK "brand" by integrating the WRC into its internship program. Beyond being simply a training program, it was then aligned with the RDB's flagship efforts to improve the business enabling environment in general and the quality of the labor force in particular.

A third group provided complementary resources in actual implementation; this was true particularly of partnership with other donor programs.<sup>64</sup> This allowed EDC to leverage other improvements in training, finance, and investment in infrastructure and equipment. The partnerships with IPs and the WDA leveraged all of these plus these organization's implementation capacity and access to certain subsets of the population. The WDA provided political sanction and legitimacy, access to a large number of students, and use of its infrastructure, human resources and equipment. The same was true of partnerships with IPs, while they lacked the political legitimation of the WDA, they allowed AK to reach very diverse populations in multiple areas.

Partnerships can play a major role in scaling up and sustainability. The AK experience illustrates that partnerships can provide: political support and legitimacy; brand recognition; certification and accreditation with their significant market value; delivery mechanisms (infrastructure, equipment, management and human resources); complementary services; and access to diverse populations. The types of partnerships and value contributed will vary in appropriateness and availability across programs and countries, but AK has provided a good initial list of examples.

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64. One example is the Belgian strengthening of the TVET system in the Southern Province.

#### **4. RECOGNIZE THE NEED FOR AN ONGOING INTERMEDIARY ORGANIZATION**

In all of the scaling scenarios, none of the delivery organizations (e.g. TVET providers, urban IPs, or rural IPs) would be sustainable without capacity building and support. An external organization, called an intermediary in some of the literature, was essential in AK and will be needed in the next phase of going to scale. Its functions would include: oversight, accreditation management, training/capacity building, policy development, and partner engagement. This entity will have its own sustainability challenges.

There are two key issues in creating an ongoing intermediary organization: capabilities and financial sustainability. Before developing such an entity, the existing organizational landscape should be assessed to determine if there is already a mechanism that can assume the activities of an intermediary organization. Additionally, a plan for sustainability of such an organization needs to be developed up front.

The need for one or more institutions to provide oversight, quality control, and other functions is quite critical regardless of whether they are public, private, or NGOs. The all too common model of going to scale, where training and capacity building are financed and provided by donors once during the initial process, ignores the need for a financially and organizationally sustainable presence to perform these functions on an ongoing basis.

#### **5. ALLOW SUFFICIENT TIME FOR SCALING UP**

The AK case confirms that scaling up takes time and usually cannot be achieved in the context of a 3-5 year project. As most of the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) country program studies show, scaling up usually takes two or three projects of similar length and resources.<sup>65</sup> These series of projects need to accomplish roughly eight goals to achieve scale and sustainability:

- 1) Test different components to learn which are the most effective;
- 2) Provide evidence that the model, once codified has the desired impact (internal validity);
- 3) Demonstrate that the model works in diverse social contexts, with different beneficiaries, and delivered by multiple types of organizations(external validity):
- 4) Improve efficiency, cost-effectiveness and simplify the model, if possible, to allow for implementation and financing at scale;
- 5) Get agreement from key stakeholders to adopt, finance and implement the program at scale;
- 6) Strengthen the system and build capacity building to create the organizational capabilities needed for implementation at large scale;
- 7) Conduct sufficient monitoring and learning activities to ensure quality and fidelity of the program; and
- 8) Sustain political and financial support while creating long-term institutional capacity to maintain program quality (e.g., revise and update curricula, train new hires).

It takes at least 5-6 years and up to 10-15 years to accomplish these goals, depending on the nature of the program, target scale, the political and financial context, and existing large scale implementation capacity.<sup>66</sup>

The lesson for USAID from the AK example is that scaling can take 2-3 project cycles, but it can only be accelerated if explicit efforts towards capacity building and advocacy for scale are begun in the first program. The AKMU was also extremely opportunistic and took advantage of key policy windows while

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65. See for example, Hartmann, Arntraud (2012a). "Scaling Up of IFAD Programs in Albania." IFAD Institutional Scaling Up Review Phase 2 Background Paper, and Hartmann, Arntraud (2012b). "Scaling Up of IFAD Programs in Ethiopia." IFAD Institutional Scaling Up Review Phase 2 Background Paper.

66. This assumes the initial pilot is included in the calculation. Estimates based on the personal experience of the principal author, Dr. Richard Kohl, based after many assessments of scaling up efforts in rural anti-poverty projects by IFAD (Hartmann & Arntraud, 2012a & 2012b) and working directly with nearly twenty efforts to scale up successful global health pilots in India from 2005-2010.

aligning with government priorities and institutional incentives For a few years now in Rwanda, youth livelihoods and vocational training have been a top GOR priority (MINECOFIN, 2013). EDC was able to market AK using the right language and institutional incentives for individual ministries and agencies. They also used their active participation in policy and technical committees to understand the market.

Close alignment with top government priorities creates natural alignment for future scaling up. When a program is closely aligned with a policy window, the time and resources are likely to be shorter. When there is little alignment with government goals, it can often require a lengthy investment to move an issue higher up on the list of political priorities.

## **6. SECURE MULTIPLE CHAMPIONS**

To achieve its current level of scale up, AK created champions in the Ministries of Labor, Education and Youth, the RDB, and the Imbuto Foundation. This is especially necessary for programs like AK (which includes workforce development), where the issues addressed by the program cut across the mandates and responsibilities of multiple government agencies. Broad-based advocacy by champions is important for several other reasons – first, there is often substantial turnover in senior positions in any one ministry or agency, and, therefore, relying on champions only from that agency is risky. In Rwanda there was substantial turnover in senior positions in the MINEDUC over the last four years, creating a virtual roller coaster of support for AK. Having champions in the private sector and civil society sectors can help maintain support for a policy and program through changes in government personnel.

## **7. ENSURE THAT THE PROGRAM HAS STRONG LEADERSHIP**

The AK example shows that strong leadership is necessary for successful scaling up. The EDC COP had several of the necessary qualities for this, including politically savvy. She devoted a substantial amount of her time building networks and relationships in order to market the program. For future programs, this means that USAID will need to ensure that either the COP or DCOP are able to devote a substantial amount of time to networking and marketing – they will also need to have the right personality and skills to do so effectively. Having a dedicated advocacy officer for the program is also recommended. In the case of AK, most of this work (including representing USAID in technical working groups), was done by the COP and the EDC team. While this proved ultimately successful, having USAID mission officers play a more active role would likely have been helpful.

## **8. INTEGRATE SCALE UP AND SUSTAINABILITY PLANS EARLIER**

The success in creating the foundation for scaling up AK was a result of highly favorable circumstances: a COP with networking and advocacy talents along with program goals that were in line with a top GOR priority. This combination is unusual, and USAID cannot always count on them to be present.

Mainstreaming scaling up and sustainability means relying on systems as well as individuals. Therefore, strategic planning about scaling and sustainability should be integrated into development of the RFP, project design and implementation of any program. This might include, at a broad level, the following activities:

- An assessment of potential sources of funding for sustainability, implementing at scale, or both. This could be from the USG, other donors, the host country government, and the private sector. Also an investigation of how the program's components might need to be modified or augmented to be eligible for that funding.
- A determination of what mechanisms exist, or would need to be built, that could deliver a program sustainably, effectively (with impact), and at anything approximating the potential scale, and what capacity building would be implied to achieve those three objectives.
- Political, policy, and stakeholder analyses of what champions and advocacy would be needed for the relevant decision makers to commit that funding and those mechanisms.



- An assessment of how the project could be aligned — the potential scale, funding, and delivery mechanisms identified—in terms of its design, cost, choice of implementation mechanisms, and capacity building to build the foundation for scaling up.

The timing of this type of analysis, goal setting, and strategizing would depend on the nature of the project itself and the context. Some could be done beforehand as part of project design - others should wait until initial learning has taken place about which components are the most viable and in what combinations. The project should have at least some persuasive evidence of impact, even if only a mid-term review, before investing a lot of resources in scaling. This is not always necessary especially in cases like AK where the program is addressing a top policy priority with no viable alternatives, but this will not always be the case.

## **9. INTEGRATE SCALING UP AND SUSTAINABILITY PLANNING INTO M&E SYSTEMS AND FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT**

AK's monitoring system has shown that most students complete the course, approximately 60-65 percent find employment, inclusive of part-time jobs, full time jobs and income generating self-employment.<sup>67</sup> Combined with strong anecdotal reports from participants, graduates, and employers and government officials about the value of the program, this provides a strong case for scaling up. However before committing further resources, stronger evidence seems necessary given that millions of dollars are involved.

The scale up of any program design has opportunity costs, including the fact that an alternative and potentially more effective program is not being tested or scaled. In the case of AK, such evidence needs to look at impact over time, cost effectiveness, and be disaggregated by components and versions of the model. It is highly preferable that such a program have more rigorous evidence than simply pre-post-test – ideally a control group design, if not a randomized control trial.

Comparative program impact is a starting point, but ultimately comparative cost effectiveness is the best criteria for scaling up. AK's financial management systems are set up to ensure fiduciary accountability, especially because of the use of sub-grants, and its monitoring systems focus largely on tracking of project outcomes relative to project goals. Taken together, these factors mean that very substantial resources have been spent on financial management and monitoring on the part of the AKMU itself and in building capacity in those areas among sub-grantees.

Ensuring that USG funds are spent appropriately and stated objectives are achieved is clearly an important and necessary function for any USG-funded program. However for purposes of scaling up, these systems are insufficient. AK's financial management system does not produce estimates of unit cost and cost effectiveness, nor does it allow for such calculations to be easily done. As with evidence of impact, financial accounting categories do not lend themselves to disaggregating these costs by versions of the model, individual components, or by types and locations of beneficiaries. For example, in designing a cost analysis for scaling up purposes, one would want to differentiate between project start-up, costs that may be specific to the project (e.g., capacity building, evaluations), and ongoing or recurring costs. It would also be helpful to have a rigorous method for allocating costs for technical support, management and supervision by types of location and project components and in-kind contributions of management, infrastructure and equipment by IPs.

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<sup>67</sup> Data as of 2014 & 2015. Employment rates were confirmed by a randomized control trial conducted in the rural areas, which also showed that AK participants were more likely to be employed over non-participants. Moreover, youth in rural areas achieved significant gains in work readiness skills development and financial management. Refer to: Alcid, Annie. A Randomized Controlled Trial of Akazi Kanoze Youth in Rural Rwanda. Education Development Center: October 2014. (<http://idd.edc.org/sites/idd.edc.org/files/RCT%20Report.pdf>)

For those USAID programs that are designed and implemented with a clear intention towards scale and sustainability if proven successful,<sup>68</sup> there need for financial management and M&E systems that:

- Use a rigorous approach to determine program impact;
- Identify unit costs and cost-effectiveness of the model, its various versions and components; and
- Generate results on indicators of interest to domestic stakeholders likely to be involved in deciding whether a program should go to scale, and adopting, managing, implementing, and funding the program at scale.

Again, whether this should be introduced from the very beginning of a project, in the middle of a project, or as part of a follow-up program will depend on the specific case.

### **10. BALANCE COMPREHENSIVENESS AND SIMPLICITY**

The core of all versions of AK is the WRC, whose purpose is to impart soft employment skills to youth. EDC recognized that the lack of these skills was a major barrier to employment or livelihoods among Rwandan youth. It added components to address these barriers like internships to provide work experience and SLGs to provide start-up capital. This can be viewed as moving up or down the “value chain” of training: from soft-skills to hard-skills (technical training) to job experience (internships) to assistance in placement (employment database using mobile phones) and on-the-job support (coaching and mentoring). A similar sequence was introduced in rural programming, where livelihoods are the more viable option. While there is no hard evidence to draw a conclusion, qualitative evidence strongly suggests that EDC was right to do this; AK would not have had success in achieving employment or livelihood outcomes without most, if not all, of these various components.

Unfortunately, for scaling up purpose, the complexity of various program versions and models poses a challenge which is likely to be true for many programs - comprehensive models are more likely to have greater impact, but are inherently more complex and, costly. They also require greater and more diverse types of organizational capacity to implement effectively. These factors taken together make comprehensive programs more difficult to scale. Simpler programs are easier to scale, especially if they are grafted onto existing delivery systems. In the case of AK, it is easier to scale up just the WRC through the TVET system than a version of AK that also includes internships, placement assistance, and mechanisms to provide start-up capital.

The tradeoff between feasible, simple projects and comprehensive results will be even more evident at scale because, in economists jargon, one is moving from partial equilibrium to general equilibrium. When training a limited number of graduates who will make up only a tiny fraction of the market, overall labor market conditions or business opportunities are less binding. At scale, however, the size of total labor demand and business opportunities will become relevant. At a minimum, this will require advocacy to address obstacles to small business creation and create an enabling environment and a formal analysis of labor demand. Going beyond that, it also will require consideration of whether complementary efforts on the demand side would make sense.

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68. Not all programs need to or should be expected to go to scale or be sustainable, there are important humanitarian, strategic and developmental objectives that can and should be addressed by relatively small scale projects. However, whether a program is designed to address a small scale problem or to serve as a pilot or demonstration project to catalyze large scale change, is a decision that should be made as early in the process as possible and be quite explicit. Preferably such guidance would be in the initial SOW and RFP/RFA, as the timing and cost of doing the relevant type of M&E and doing a scaling up assessment, as suggested above, would need to be planned from the beginning, even if contingent upon results.

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## ANNEX I. INTERVIEW PROTOCOLS AND LIST OF INTERVIEWEES

### Interview Protocol for Implementing Partner Management Interview

1. Which components of Akazi Kanoze does this organization implement? WRC? Technical training (sectors)? Entrepreneurship training? ALP?
2. What is the demographic mix of this organization's participants and graduates?
3. What categories of participant (age, gender, education, income) received what kinds of training?
4. Do you provide any other types of specialized training/services (e.g., sexual reproductive health, entrepreneurship, micro-lending, etc.)?
5. What did the organizational capacity assessment of this organization show?
6. Other than the basic training of trainers, what organizational capacity building does AK provide to this organization?
7. What were the results? How does AK currently assess the capacity of this organization?
8. What are the unit costs of this organization in implementing the AK program? Per component? Per graduate? Per employment opportunity?
9. Who in your organization is involved in implementing AK? What are their roles and responsibilities?
10. How was this staff recruited and trained? How are they monitored and supervised?
11. What has gone well in implementing AK? What challenges have you faced?
12. What is the mix (age, relative poverty, gender, educational level) of the youth population that your organization serves? Was that specifically recruited for the AK program, or one that you already served for the delivery of other programs?
13. What are the barriers for participation in and completion of this program? Who do these barriers affect?
14. Do you have more demand for participation in this program than you have slots? Do you have a sense of how many more would participate if there was more room?
15. What types of career counseling and placement services do you offer?
16. What types of support for entrepreneurs and starting of small businesses?
17. What is the demand from employers for graduates who have completed the various components of AK that you deliver? From what sectors? For what types of positions?
18. What additional skills (and components to achieve them) are needed by graduates that are not currently included in the program? Demanded by employers, if different?
19. Are there any components that should be cut? Simplified? If so, why?
20. What do you feel have been the most significant achievements or impact of AK for your graduates?
21. What types of youth tend to benefit most from the program—age, previous education, level of income or poverty?
22. What types of youth tend to benefit least from the program—age, previous education, level of income or poverty?
23. What plans has your organization already made, if any, to scale project components? What are they? How was this done?
24. Who are the main stakeholders, and constituents of the project in your area? Employers? District officials? Other?
25. What are their primary concerns and interests?
26. What more needs to be done in terms of aligning and mobilizing stakeholder support, buy-in, and agreement in order to support scale up?
27. Once the current program ends, do you see the need for a continuing role for some sort of national organization? If so, what would that organization do?
28. Who is currently providing leadership and vision for your organization as it implements AK?
29. What additional leadership is necessary for the future? For scaling up?
30. What untapped leadership potential is there for AK in your organization or community?
31. What types of training did AK do for your organization? Other activities to strengthen your organization?

32. How specifically did it improve the effectiveness of your organization?
33. What type of external support, training, and capacity building will you need on an ongoing basis to continue to implement AK effectively?
34. What are the current sources of funding for your organization as a whole? To implement AK?
35. What future sources of funding and other resources do you see as likely? Government institutions? Donors? Earned income?
36. What types of formal accreditation does your organization have? What types of additional formal accreditation would be helpful? What are the challenges in getting that?
37. What types of diplomas or certificates are you able to offer graduates? What types of additional diplomas or certificates would you like to be able to offer? What are the challenges in being able to do so?
38. What other public or NGO programs exist in your area that prepare youth for employment, self-employment or other livelihoods? Placement?
39. What types of private sector services exist in your area that provide youth training for employment, self-employment or other livelihoods? Placement and career counseling?
40. How does your program compare in terms of population served? Quality? Outcomes achieved?

### **Interview Protocol for Employers**

1. What kind of business do you run?
2. What kind of graduates have you taken from IP? Are these employees, internships or others? For what positions?
3. Why did you hire these employees? What was your criteria?
4. In general, what qualities are you looking for in an employee for these positions?
5. How have the employees you hired from this IP performed? What was different or better than other employees that you've hired?
6. Would you hire more graduates in the future if you had positions open?
7. What specific skills do you think the graduates of this program have that differentiate them from others?
8. What types of attitudes and abilities for working effectively, apart from their technical knowledge, do they have?
9. How did the relationship that you have with this IP develop? Who initiated it?
10. How does this relationship get maintained? How do you communicate your needs in terms of employees, qualifications, etc. to the IP?
11. Have you given this IP feedback on what else you are seeking in the interns or employees that they send you? Do you feel this has been taken into account?
12. Have you participated in any of the IP's forums in your sector? Do you come and talk to their students about what is required to work in your organization? What has been your experience with this?
13. What other mechanisms do you use for hiring people?
14. What additional skills would you like to see included in the training the IP graduates receive? What else could be done to improve the quality of employees and their performance?

### **Interview Protocol for COP and Team**

#### *Basics*

1. What objectives was the program designed to achieve? Are these different from what was in the original program proposal?
2. How was the design developed? By whom? What existing programs or materials did it draw on?
3. How was the program design developed to address the special needs of OVCs? Of gender?
4. What are the program's components?
5. What are the key intangible or tacit components of the program that were important to achieving its impact?
6. What soft skills does WRC deliver on? How does this compare with the types of soft skills demanded by employers?

7. What sectors does technical training cover?
8. What skills does technical training deliver? Is this standardized across IPs? By sector?
9. What types of placement services are offered by IPS?
10. How has the program's components evolved during implementation? What changes were made? Why, in response to what factors or challenges?
11. How were implementing partners (IPs) identified, assessed and selected?
12. Are there different standards for delivering the program through sub-grantees and non-sub-grantees?
13. Why have some IPs been added and others dropped?
14. How was the program designed or implemented to ensure it achieved its targets in terms of number of OVCs? What role did the selection of IPs play?
15. Is there a standard model of what positions an IP has to have in order to implement AK? Trainers? Placement officers? Other?
16. What types of initial training does the project offer IPs and their staff?
17. What types of ongoing support, coaching, mentoring, etc. does the project offer IPs and their staff?
18. How do IP's identify employers in which to place graduates for jobs or internships? What training or support, if any, does the project provide to IPs to help develop partnerships with employers?
19. What are the terms of partnerships with employers? Are they formalized in an MOU or some other document?
20. Who does the radio programming? What is likely to happen to that after the current period of USAID funding ends?
21. How does the SMS work?
22. What services and resources does the AK network provide?
23. Who manages the AK network? Staffs this?

#### *Social and Other External Factors*

24. How did traditionally different expectations of young men and women in terms of parents' support for continued schooling and domestic housework responsibilities, early marriage and childbearing, etc. affect their respective participation?
25. How did the project compensate for these differences?
26. How does distance and availability of affordable transportation to training locations affect participants' ability to participate?
27. How does distance and availability of affordable transportation for graduates from home affect their ability to access to economic opportunities?
28. What is the education level of most participants in Kigali? Of rural participants? Do they actually perform at grade level?
29. How does the program address the basic education needs of youth whose skill levels are below the minimum needed for WRC and technical training?
30. What did the project do, if anything, to compensate for barriers present in the external enabling environment? What more is needed?

#### *Monitoring & Evaluation*

31. What evaluation indicators and systems structures are currently in place or were used during the program?
32. Does the project only monitor performance of sub-grantees, or also non-grantees and TVET schools that are implementing program components?
33. What types of evaluations or surveys have been done of employers in terms of the utility of program skills overall and individual components? Results?
34. How does the project track post-graduation performance of participants? What do the data show?
35. Are there any benchmarks against which this program can be assessed (e.g., 1 year of upper secondary-level TVET or some other measure)?
36. What additional indicators and monitoring mechanisms could have been in place from the start to better prepare for scaling up?

*Impact (for each question ask what is the basis for that assessment, as appropriate)*

37. What do you think are the strengths and weaknesses of the program?
38. What is the mix (age, relative poverty, gender, educational level) of the youth population that the program has reached?
39. What categories of participants (age, gender, education) received what kinds of training?
40. What is the breakdown of employment opportunities (self-employment, employment, internships, other) into which participants were placed? By type of participant (age, gender, education)?
41. What challenges has reaching OVCs posed for the program? What have been the results of the program for OVCs in terms of employment opportunities?
42. Is it possible to separate out the impact of the different components? If so, what has been that impact?
43. How have program results varied across implementing partners?
44. Why are some partners more successful than others?

*Costs and Funding*

45. Where do IPs get their funding?
46. What are the costs per graduate for the different versions of the program? What share is paid by the program? What share is paid by IPs? What is the total cost per graduate?
47. How feasible is the idea that IPs can sell workforce readiness training services to the private sector? Willingness to pay? How much could they earn? Evidence to date?
48. How feasible is the idea that individual IPs can compete effectively for grants or sub-grants from USAID or other donors to support their livelihoods training efforts after the current funding for AK ends?

*Preparing for Scale Up*

49. What scaling up has already occurred? More locations? Greater numbers? Rural? New sectors? Other?
50. What were the drivers behind that?
51. Who was responsible for setting goals and planning for scale up?
52. What delivery mechanisms (implementers) were used to achieve additional scale?
53. What is the current and projected overall need nationally for youth livelihoods training?
54. In what districts or regions is there the strongest need?
55. Among what sub-categories of youth is there the strongest need?
56. Future employment and self-employment opportunities are expected to grow most rapidly in what sectors? In rural areas in particular?
57. What components should be added, simplified, modified, or strengthened to facilitate scale up?
58. How big is the problem of youth who do not have adequate basic educational attainment to benefit from a livelihoods training and placement program? Should the program continue to address this issue in some or all locations?
59. What effort has already gone into planning for future scale up of the project?
60. To what extent does scaling up goals and a formal or informal strategy for achieving them exist?
61. What kind of buy-in is there from key stakeholders for the program? How was that achieved?
62. What organizations are the best suited to implement AK at scale? Do these organizations have the necessary capacity?

*Leadership*

63. Which individuals and organizations are currently providing the leadership and vision of the project?
64. What changes in leadership have occurred over the course of the project, and why?
65. What leadership would need to be in place for the program to function as an independent entity? To be scaled up?

*Other Programs and Comparative Advantage*

66. What other programs are being implemented in the area of youth livelihoods? What are their components? Who is funding which ones? Who is implementing them?

67. How do these other programs compare in terms of sectors, components, quality and results?
68. How do these programs compare to AK in terms of types of participants and locations?

#### *Stakeholders*

69. Who are the main stakeholders, and constituents of the project?
70. What role have various stakeholders played in the implementation of the program? Scaling up to date?
71. Do stakeholders feel that the activities and outcomes of the program meet or address their concerns and interests?
72. What stakeholders would likely be involved in scaling up?
73. What types of advocacy, marketing, or outreach/sensitization has the program management or implementers undertaken to build support for the program and scaling up?
74. What more needs to be done in terms of aligning and mobilizing stakeholder support, buy-in, and agreement in order to support scale up and sustainability?

#### *Incentives*

75. How are implementing partners held accountable for the quality of delivery of the program? How is that monitored? Ensuring broad participation? Achieving Results? What incentives or motivation do they have to do so?
76. What does EDC do when an implementing partner is not implementing the program or a component as designed? Underperforming in terms of participation, graduation rates, or placements?
77. How are trainers, placement officers, and other front-line service providers held accountable to implement this model with quality and as designed? How is that monitored? What incentives or motivation do they have to do so?
78. How can accreditation or certification be used to maintain quality and fidelity by trainers and IP after the current period of funding ends? What organizational mechanism could oversee that?

#### *Organizational Capacity and Capacity Building*

79. What types of institutional capacity assessments were done for government delivery systems like the WDA TVET providers, and RDBs? What were the results? What are the outstanding challenges?
80. What types of institutional capacity assessments were done for implementing partners? What were the results?
81. What kinds of capacity building were undertaken?
82. What impact have these capacity-building efforts had on the effective capacity, organizational culture, systems of IPs? Other impact?
83. At what scale can IPs deliver the program given their current capacity?
84. What additional IPs and service providers might need to be recruited to reach the desired scale?
85. What type of external support, training, and capacity building will you need on an ongoing basis for IPS to continue to implement the program sustainably and with quality?

#### *Coordination*

86. What types of coordination and management functions does the project provide for the program overall?
87. What types of coordination mechanisms will be necessary to put in place for scale up? How do these compare with the mechanisms that are already in place?

#### *The Policy and Enabling Environment*

88. What is the level of political support for youth livelihoods training? For AK in particular?
89. What policies are currently in place to support youth, youth development, or youth employment? What additional policies are needed, or changes in policy?
90. What is the government doing in terms of translating existing youth policies into programs and activities on the ground? Strengths, weaknesses, challenges?

91. What roles do the various Ministries play in youth livelihoods training?
92. What regulations and procedures are currently in place that affect AK? What additional regulations are needed, or changes in regulation?
93. What are the current standards for accreditation and certification?
94. How do the program's goals, activities, and outcomes align with existing policy and the political and institutional goals of key government institutions?
95. What are the constraints on creating and sustaining employment, self-employment, and MSMEs?
96. How has the program addressed these issues in terms of advocacy to change the policy or enabling environment?

### **Interview Protocol for Meeting with IP teachers**

1. How long have you worked here? What are your responsibilities other than delivering AK? What is your professional background and training?
2. What components of the AK program do you deliver?
3. What kind of training and on-going mentoring and coaching have you received to deliver these components?
4. How well do you feel that this prepared you to deliver the program? What could be added, improved, or strengthened?
5. How do you deliver these components besides lectures? To what extent is the training participatory or experiential? Does it include field visits, projects, and other activities?
6. What qualities make for a good trainer?
7. What are the intangible factors that are essential to making this training effective?
8. What do you see as the strengths and weaknesses of the program components that you deliver?
9. How effective is it in preparing youth for work or self-employment? What could be added, improved, or strengthened to make it more effective?
10. What other activities do you deliver that are complementary to the AK program? How do they complement it?
11. What types of students tend to be the most successful in the AK program and in getting employment afterward? The least successful? Why? What can be done about improving the success of the least successful?
12. What are the barriers or challenges for students to participate in AK? How can these be addressed?

### **Interview Protocol for Meeting with Government Officials**

1. We know that the government has several strategic documents that make youth livelihoods and employment training a major priority. Can you tell us how these are being implemented (e.g., translated into actual programs), and what progress has been made?
2. What are the government's major priorities in this area for the next few years?
3. How big is the problem of youth who do not have adequate basic educational attainment to benefit from a livelihoods training program? Should the program continue to address this issue in some or all locations?
4. What do you see as the most important youth livelihoods training programs implemented in Rwanda besides this program? Who is funding them? Implementing them?
5. How do these programs compare to AK in terms of sectors, components, and quality?
6. Are there specific districts or sub-groups of youth that have particular need of such a program? What are the challenges, if any, in reaching those locations and sub-groups?
7. What do you think are the strengths and weaknesses of the program? How well do you think the program meets the needs of youth for livelihoods training? Of employers?
8. Should it go to scale? Where? Focusing on what types of youth?
9. What changes do you think should be made to the program if it is to be extended or for scaling up?
10. To what extent are government organizations, such as TVET institutions, a viable delivery mechanism for AK? What additional capacity building might be needed?
11. What changes do you think need to be made in terms of policies, regulations, certification, and accreditation for the program to be more effective and go to scale? How can this be done?

12. What sources of government funding, apart from donor-funded projects, might be available to support the scaling up of the program?
13. How could we ensure that our report on scaling AK is most useful to you? What specific questions would you like to see answered?

### **Interview Protocol for Meeting with Donors**

1. We know that the government has several strategic documents that relate to youth employment and training. How important a political priority is this for the government? What do you see as the government's major priorities in this area for the next few years?
2. What are your agency's current priorities in youth education and livelihoods training? Future priorities?
3. What current programs are you supporting? What issues are they expected to address? What programs do you have coming on line in the near future?
4. How are these programs doing in terms of implementation? What challenges have these programs faced? How have the problems been addressed?
5. What do you think of our program? Its strengths and weaknesses?
6. What other youth livelihoods training programs are being implemented that contain similar components or address similar issues? Who is funding them? Implementing them?
7. What are their strengths and weaknesses? What are the gaps that need to be addressed?
8. How do these programs compare in terms of sectors, components, and coverage to our program?
9. Where do you see the greatest need for youth livelihoods training geographically or in terms of particular sub-groups of youth? What are the challenges, if any, in reaching those locations and sub-groups?
10. How big is the problem of youth who do not have adequate basic educational attainment to benefit from a livelihoods training program? Do any of your programs address this issue?
11. Should it go to scale? Where? Focusing on what types of youth?
12. What changes do you think need to be made in terms of policies, regulations, certification, and accreditation affecting youth livelihoods training programs to be more effective and go to scale? How can this be done?
13. To what extent are government organizations such as TVET institutions a viable delivery mechanism for AK? What additional capacity building might be needed?
14. What sources of funding, from government or donors, might be available to support the scaling up of this program?
15. How could we ensure that our report is most useful to you? What specific questions would you like to see answered?

### **Interview Protocol for Meeting with USAID Mission Officers**

1. What do you think are the strengths and weaknesses of the program?
2. How well do you think the program meets the needs of youth for livelihoods training? Of employers?
3. What changes do you think should be made to the program if it is to be extended or for scaling up? What existing components or sectors might need to be dropped or simplified? What new components or sectors might need to be added?
4. In what locations and to what demographic sub-groups of youth is there the greatest need for the program? What are the challenges, if any, in reaching those locations and sub-groups?
5. How big is the problem of youth who do not have adequate basic educational attainment to benefit from a livelihoods training and placement program? Should programs continue to address this issue in some or all locations?
6. What organizations are the best suited to implement at scale? Do these organizations have the necessary capacity? Other than training, what organizational strengthening do you think might be needed? To what extent are government organizations such as TVET institutions a viable delivery mechanism?

7. What other programs are being implemented in the area of youth livelihoods in Rwanda? Who is funding them? Implementing them?
8. How do these programs compare in terms of sectors, components, and quality to the USAID program?
9. What changes do you think need to be made in the enabling environment—policies, regulations, infrastructure—for the USAID program to go to scale?
10. To what extent is there support for youth livelihoods programs among policy makers, government officials, and other stakeholders? For the USAID program in particular
11. Outside of USAID, what other sources of funding do you think are possible for scaling up the program?
12. How could we ensure that our report is most useful to you? What specific questions would you like to see answered?

## **List of Interviewees**

### **EDC**

Melanie Sany, Chief of Party, EDC  
 Steve Kamanzi, Deputy Chief of Party, EDC  
 Maurice Masozera, M&E Specialist, EDC  
 Laura Shemeza, Private Sector Specialist, EDC  
 Anne Marie Mukarugambwa, Education and Training Manager, EDC  
 Jacques Sezikeye, local partner manager, EDC  
 Donatien Hazitayezu, Entrepreneur Specialist, EDC  
 Virgil Uzabumugabo, ALP coordinator, EDC

### **IPs**

Elvani Mutsiri, Project Manager, AVSI  
 Loretta Birara, Country Representative, AVSI  
 Janet Rubeugeria, Master Trainer & Project Assistant, AVSI  
 Fidele Mutivare, Project Assistant & Trainer, AVSI  
 Jean Didace Rwanziza, Local Adviser, CSDI  
 Jean Claude Cubaka, Teacher, CSDI  
 Sefu Bikorimana, Teacher, CSDI  
 Laurent Hattirwuoize, teacher, CSDI  
 Diendonne Kimenyi, Project Manager, CSDI  
 Fabrice Gatete, Managing Director, BDSS  
 Bertrand Maniraguha, BDSS  
 Phamuel Sinedayiheba, Regional Coordinator, AEE  
 Prosper Ngertanihaye, Trainer, AEE  
 Alexis Niyonzima, Trainer, AEE  
 LeAnn Hager, Country Representative, CRS Rwanda  
 Marie-Noelle Senyana-Mottier, Head of Programs, CRS Rwanda  
 Theoneste Ndababonye, Senior M&E Officer, CRS Rwanda  
 Vincent Ndekazi, Executive Director, Frontiers  
 Asnath Uwizeye, Accountant, Esther's Aid  
 Hubert Nukumbo, Project Coordinator, Esther's Aid  
 Gaudence Mukandaysenga, Supervisor, Esther's Aid  
 Ben Rumaryiku, Administration, Esther's Aid  
 Jean Baptist Kimanda, Teacher, Esther's Aid  
 Justus Uwayesu, English Teacher, Esther's Aid  
 Yvonne Ingabire, Project Officer, Benimpuhwe  
 Marie Rose Nyirabaturida, Project Officer, Benimpuhwe  
 Kamaliza Merveille, Field Officer, Benimpuhwe  
 Verdiane Nyiramana, Executive Secretary, Benimpuhwe



Celestin Habimana, National Coordinator, CPJSP  
Emmanuel Higiro, Staff, CPJSP  
Gilbert Ndangamira, Principle, Mpanda VTC  
Rosine Niyirora, Trainer, Mpanda VTC  
Remy Murwanashyaka, M&E Officer, Myanza  
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Anastase Murekezi, Minister, MIFOTRA  
Rosemary Mbabazi, Permanent Secretary, MYICT  
Boniface Rucagu, Chairman, Itorero  
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Hannington Namara, CEO, Private Sector Federation

## ANNEX 2. AKAZI KANOZE MODEL COMPONENTS

Name	Target Issue	Description	Desired Outcomes	Target Population
<b>Accelerated Basic Education (ABE)</b>	Lack of basic literacy and numeracy skills.	300 hours of literacy in Kinyarwanda, 200 hours of mathematics instruction, and sometimes 100 hours in English.	Youth gain basic education skills needed to understand the WRC and TT materials. Find meaningful employment or return to school.	Younger youth (14–24) who have less than P6 skill levels. More need exists in rural areas.
<b>Work Readiness Curriculum (WRC)</b>	Lack of soft skills like customer service	A 100-hour, 8-module curriculum, including personal development, interpersonal communication, good work habits, leadership, safety and health, employee rights, financial literacy, and entrepreneurship.	Strong sense of self, clear goals, and marketable skills.	Youth of all ages (14–35), education levels, and regions
<b>Technical Training (TT)</b>	Lack of technical skills demanded by the market.	Vocational training in five main sectors: hospitality construction, agribusiness, and service. . .	Capable youth whose skills match employer demand and who can “hit the ground running.”	Youth 16–35 and have access to formal sector employment.
<b>Income Generating Activities (IGAs)</b>	Lack of access to formal employment opportunities.	Trains young people in startup and management of micro and small businesses and cooperatives. The 35 hours include the following modules: Getting Ready for Business, Finding and Establishing a Good Business Idea, Record Keeping and Financial Management, and Cooperative Management.	Youth gain ability to start a business and increase their standard of living.	Rural youth, 16–35, who do not have access to formal employment and often have lower education levels.
<b>Internships</b>	Lack of hands-on learning.	One to six months spent with an employer to gain practical experience and skills in the world of work. Some internships are paid, some offer transportation reimbursement or nothing at all.	Youth gain experience and market-relevant skills. Opportunities for employment with the host company.	Out of school youth who are 16–35 and have potential access to formal sector employment.
<b>Job Placement &amp; Follow-up</b>	Lack of connection to employers, mentors, coaches.	AK graduates receive assistance in developing CV’s, learning interview skills, and understanding how to connect with employers. Entrepreneurs are sometimes connected to mentors and coaches.	Youth have the skills and support needed to secure an open job or start a business.	Any AK graduate transitions to employment or entrepreneurship
<b>Saving and Lending Groups</b>	Lack of access to financing.	In SLGs, youth engage in monthly savings and pool their savings to offer interest-bearing loans to people in the group.	Financially literate youth with access to capital to start or grow a small business.	Rural youth with low education levels and little access to formal employment.

## **AKAZI KANOZE MODEL VARIATIONS**

### **1. AK Urban Classic**

The majority of youth served by AK have passed through the combination of components referred to as AK Urban Classic—a program which is delivered to youth with primary or secondary school educations in urban/peri-urban areas. As the labor markets in urban areas have greater potential to absorb youth than those in rural areas, AK Urban Classic focuses mostly on preparing youth for formal employment opportunities. The majority of implementing partners are NGOs, but some SMEs and social enterprises also deliver the program. Technical training is usually provided by IPs, but some outsource it to TVET institutions or offer on-the-job training through private companies. Some IPs provide only one vocational track, while others offer several. Many of the graduates who participated in focus group discussions with the research team wished that they had more than a few tracks to choose from, especially students from those IPs offering more traditional occupations rather than ICT. Students thought it was advantageous for IPs to offer multiple tracks.

### **2. In-School Youth**

This version, also called the “holiday program,” is delivered to youth that are still in formal secondary school—not vocational schools. It contains only the WRC curriculum and is delivered in an intensive manner to accommodate school vacation period. Youth return to school when they are finished with the WRC.

### **3. PERI-URBAN SLG**

The SLG Peri-Urban scheme is implemented by Catholic Relief Services (CRS) and Rwanda Youth Parliament (PAJER) through, respectively, Savings and Internal Lending Communities (SILCs) and Village Savings and Loan Associations (VSLA) groups.<sup>69</sup> Unlike youth in the AK classic model, youth in the Peri-Urban areas tend to start their own IGAs after training (at least half of them do). Their proximity to Kigali gives them an opportunity to run certain types of businesses, such as transport, small shops, and buying and reselling agricultural products.

### **4. AK RURAL CLASSIC**

The AK Rural Classic scheme was developed for AK’s expansion into rural areas in 2011. This scheme primarily serves youth with P4 educations up to secondary school completers. AK staff sees potential in agribusiness and low-skill construction trades, but they realize that demand in most sectors (ICT, hospitality) is limited. Understanding the challenges of formal employment in rural areas, a curriculum was developed that places greater emphasis on small business start-up and cooperative management.

### **5. RDB**

The RDB Internship Program prepares university graduates for work in the public and, to a lesser extent, private sector. While university graduates are not AK’s primary target population, EDC felt that the WRC was relevant to students with all levels of education and welcomed the visibility that came with serving RDB interns. This is the only version of the model that EDC (the AKMU master trainers) delivers directly.

### **6. TVET**

The WDA recently developed 21 new vocational curricula for its TVET schools, into which it has integrated the 100-hour WRC.<sup>70</sup> TVET institutions offer a broad range of TT opportunities with a focus on hospitality and tourism, construction and building services, ICT, agriculture, technical manufacturing, assembling and servicing, clean and sustainable energy, arts and crafts, beauty and aesthetics, and film

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69. “Village Savings and Loan Associations (VSLAs) attempt to overcome the difficulties of offering credit to the rural poor by building on a [rotating savings and credit associations] (ROSCA) model to create groups of people who can pool their savings in order to have a source of lending funds. Members make savings contributions to the pool, and can also borrow from it.” See Dean Karlan and Bram Thuysbaert “Evaluating Savings and Loan Associations in Malawi” Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab, Cambridge, MA.

70. It is an ambitious plan given the varied capabilities among TVET schools, the innovative nature of the WRC pedagogy, and the relatively limited implementation capacity of the WDA. A scenario for mainstreaming WRC into the TVET system that details challenges, necessary supports and cost can be found later in the paper (V.B).

making (MIFOTRA, 2012). The TVET structure parallels the formal education system, offering upper secondary equivalent certifications in vocational training centers (VTCs) and technical secondary schools (TSS), and university level diplomas from polytechnic schools (IPRCs). The cost of attending a TVET is approximately 30,000 RWF per trimester without board and 200,000 RWF per year with board; in addition to these costs, students must pay for uniforms, school supplies and other expenses. The combination of cost and a requirement of 9 years of formal education to enroll prevent many disadvantaged youth from accessing the TVET system.<sup>71</sup>

## **7. RURAL SLG**

To bring a standardized SLG methodology to AK, EDC partnered with CRS and their local implementer, Caritas, who provides SILC sensitization and training to young people in Rwanda. At the start of AK, SILCs were implemented in the urban areas with little effect due to the transience of the youth population, a greater focus on formal employment over IGAs, and a youth selection process that did not account for participant proximity. A move to rural areas in which youth are more stable and formal employment opportunities less available, combined with a more targeted participant selection process enabled the SILC program to flourish. Youth in these areas generally have less education (P4 – secondary completers) and tend to focus on starting agribusiness-focused IGAs.

Recruitment for this model is based on self-selection and an important criterion for group formation is that members must be located in close proximity to one another. The 1-year program begins with sensitization to SILC and formation of SILC groups. Young people living in these communities are trained by EDC and they then provide 100 hours of WRC to SILC members. After the groups have been running for 5–7 months, Caritas then delivers the 1-month, 8-module CRS IGA Selection, Planning, and Management curriculum.<sup>72</sup>

## **8. ALP**




The ALP program is similar to the Rural Classic with the addition that it begins with classes in literacy and numeracy for those young people who have dropped out of primary school. The aim is to quickly bring them up to a P6 level so they can either (1) re-enroll in formal school and sit for the National Primary Exam; (2) enter the workforce with a basic level of education and additional technical skills; or (3) pursue additional vocational training. ALP is an 18-month program. The first 6 months consists of the Accelerated Basic Education (ABE), which includes of 300 hours of literacy in Kinyarwanda, 200 hours of math, and, where English competency is needed, 100 hours of English. After the basic education courses, ALP programs provide 6 months of technical training and WRC, and 6 months of internship combined with mentorship and coaching. The first cohort of 400 participants entered the program in March 2012 and had already completed the ABE portion as of late 2012. They were expected to finish the remainder in October 2013. The second cohort of 300 started in January 2013 and will be done in the summer of 2014. Accordingly, there is no data on the results of this version in terms of employment opportunities.

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71. It is hoped that either the WDA will begin delivering TVET training to less educated youth or provide them with a catch-up program that will quickly move them up to grade 9.

72. The SPM created by CRS is different than the AK IGA training previously described.

## ANNEX 3. RWANDA YOUTH POPULATION DATA



Source: U.S. Census Bureau, International Database

## ANNEX 4. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON KEY STAKEHOLDERS

Stakeholder	Type	Role in AK	Interests/Incentives to sustain or scale AK	Resources & Implementation capacity
USAID	Donor	Provides funding, guidance, and oversight to AK	AK represents supply-side efforts to improve the Rwandan economy.	USAID education funds are now restricted to basic education; this limits resources for AK as it is considered workforce development. Little interest exhibited by other offices.
EDC	Implementer	Manages/implements AK	EDC has implemented the program for the last four years.	EDC has an experienced team and has performed well in implementing AK thus far.
WDA	Government	Provided input on curricula and is the public sector certification entity	The WDA manages the national TVET system and plans incorporate the WRC into all Level 3 (Certificate I) public TVET programs.	WDA program resources come mostly from donors and are project specific; therefore, donor buy-in to WRC incorporation in the TVET system is key. WDA has very little institutional capacity to incorporate the WRC in to their TVET system, which would include training WRC instructors, modifications to the curriculum, WRC certification and oversight, etc. WDA does have capacity to coordinate the effort and certify the curriculum.
RDB	Government	400 RDB interns go through the WRC per year.	Some within the organization would like to see it expanded to all RDB interns (1,200 per year). WRC also fits in well as an offering at the RDB-run BDCs.	BDCs are an appropriate venue in which to provide the WRC, but implementation would likely have to include funding from donors. <sup>73</sup>
Itorero	Government	None	In the most notable of Itorero's programs, large numbers of recent secondary school graduates are trained in Rwandan history, health, patriotism, the importance of hard work, and traditional Rwandan values. Itorero acknowledged the potential to fit the WRC into its current curriculum.	Itorero is primarily government funded. It is not clear what capacity the institution has to implement the WRC in their youth program.

73. The social enterprise BDSS, currently an AK grantee, operates a BDC in Kigali. They implement the WRC with grant funding from AK.

<b>Stakeholder</b>	<b>Type</b>	<b>Role in AK</b>	<b>Interests/Incentives to sustain or scale AK</b>	<b>Resources &amp; implementation capacity</b>
MYICT	Government	None	MYICT YEGOs are might be able to utilize the WRC as a complement to current offerings (e.g., ICT training, English, and business skills).	YEGOs are an appropriate place to implement the WRC, yet donor funding would likely be required.
Private Sector Federation (PSF)	Private	None	As the major national advocate for the private sector, the PSF is interested in reducing the skills gap in the labor market. The PSF also funds programs (e.g., kLab), which could incorporate the WRC.	If deemed a worthwhile project, private sector actors could potentially fund some portion of the AK model through the PSF.
Private Employers	Private	Employer feedback on AK graduates has been positive.	Employers identified a critical need to train young people in life skills.	Some employers expressed a willingness to pay for the AK training (particularly the WRC), which offers the possibility to sustain AK through fees for service.
Development Partners	Donor	None	The WRC is generally acknowledged as a good and comprehensive life skills curriculum. Some of the donors are, however, developing their own similar curricula (e.g., Stryde). It is not clear if any donors would support all variations of the AK model or the WRC.	The development partners provide differing levels of technical assistance, funding, management, curriculum development, and service delivery to the public and private TVET systems.
TechnoServe	Non-profit	Implements a similar workforce readiness curriculum (Stryde) in partnership with The MasterCard Foundation	Stryde is a competing program	Strong implementation capacity, especially in rural areas
Implementing NGOs and Social Enterprises	Non-profit	Local implementers of the AK model. Provide vocational and life skills training, basic education, savings and lending groups, mentorship, and job placement.	AK grants leverage their current vocational training programs. The WRC also improves the quality of their programming and attracts additional students by increasing the implementers' status and benefits to students.	Most would need funding and technical support to continue offering AK programming in its current form



## ANNEX 5: IMPLEMENTING PARTNERS

As of April 2014, according to the Akazi Kanoze website, implementing partners were:

<b>RWANDAN PARTNERS</b>	<b>INTERNATIONAL PARTNERS</b>
African Evangelistic Enterprise (AEE)	Education Development Center
ASOFERWA Association (Association de Solidarité des Femmes Rwandaise)	Catholic Relief Services
ATEDEC (Action Technique pour un Developpement Communautaire)	Academy for Educational Development
AVSI	EcoVentures International (EVI)
Bamporeze	Search for Common Ground
Business Design Supplying and Services Ltd	
Camara	
CEFOTRAR	
COATB	
COOJAD	
CSDI (Community Social Development Initiative)	
Esther's Aid for Needy and Abandoned Children	
Frontiers Great Lakes	
Jeunesse Ouvriere Chretienne	
Karisimbi Garage	
KORA	
Lions Club	
MAXIMEDIA	
PAJER (Rwanda Youth Parliament)	
SOS-Village D'Enfants	
Strive Foundation	
Source Vive	
UTEXRWA	
YES Rwanda	

## ANNEX 6: OUTCOME DATA FROM AKAZI KANOZE THROUGH DECEMBER 2012<sup>74</sup>

### A. Total Number of Youth Entered, Completed, Still in Training by Educational Attainment and Age

Educational Attainment		Number Entered Program No.	Completed Program No.	Still in Training No.	Completed as Percent of Entered %
Male	P6 or less	1,538	1,292	71	88
	S1-S3	1,274	1,055	117	91
	S4-S6	1,625	1,366	74	88
	Other	414	306	6	75
	<b>Total</b>	<b>4,851</b>	<b>4,019</b>	<b>268</b>	<b>87</b>
Female	P6 or less	1,700	1,401	132	89
	S1-S3	1,260	1,049	96	90
	S4-S6	1,569	1,336	55	88
	Other	357	243	5	69
	<b>Total</b>	<b>4,886</b>	<b>4,029</b>	<b>288</b>	<b>88</b>
<b>Grand Total</b>		<b>9,737</b>	<b>8,048</b>	<b>556</b>	<b>88</b>

Age		Number Entered Program No.	Completed Program No.	Still in Training No.	Completed as Percent of Entered %
Male	Under 20	2,167	1,712	141	85
	20+	2,684	2,307	127	90
	<b>Total</b>	<b>4,851</b>	<b>4,019</b>	<b>268</b>	<b>87</b>
Female	Under 20	2,306	1,855	183	87
	20+	2,580	2,174	105	88
	<b>Total</b>	<b>4,886</b>	<b>4,029</b>	<b>288</b>	<b>88</b>
<b>Grand Total</b>		<b>9,737</b>	<b>8,048</b>	<b>556</b>	<b>88</b>

Notes: The data cover the time period October 2009 – December 2012. Education levels are from when youth entered the program and “Age” is the age when youth entered the program. “Other” includes university students/graduates and those who did not specify their education. “Completed as percent of entered” is calculated as the number completing the program (number entered program – the number still in training).

Source: EDC (2013) Monitoring and evaluation data spreadsheet.

<sup>74</sup> On average, each year the project calculated a placement rate in an economic opportunity being at 60-65%. Since the time of this report, this placement rate was confirmed by a recent randomized control trial which found that AK participants were more likely to be employed than non-participants. Refer to: Alcid, Annie. A Randomized Controlled Trial of Akazi Kanoze Youth in Rural Rwanda. Education Development Center: October 2014. (<http://idd.edc.org/sites/idd.edc.org/files/RCT%20Report.pdf>)

### D. WRC Exam Scores by Educational Attainment and Age

Education	Sat for the Exam No.	Did Not Pass Exam		Passed with Satisfaction		Passed with Distinction		Passed with High Distinction	
		No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
<b>P6 or less</b>	2,693	36	1.34	828	30.75	1,080	40.10	749	27.81
<b>S1-S3</b>	2,104	2	0.10	233	11.07	768	36.50	1,101	52.33
<b>S4-S6</b>	2,702	1	0.04	94	3.48	542	20.06	2,065	76.42
<b>Total</b>	7,499	39	0.52	1,155	15.40	2,390	31.87	3,915	52.21

Age	Sat for the Exam No.	Did Not Pass Exam		Passed with Satisfaction		Passed with Distinction		Passed with High Distinction	
		No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Under 20	3,567	27	.76	690	19.34	1,243	34.85	1,607	45.05
20+	4,481	15	.33	543	12.12	1,329	29.66	2,594	57.89
<b>Total</b>	8,048	42	.52	1,155	14.35	2,390	29.70	3,915	48.65

Notes: The data cover the time period October 2009 – December 2012. Totals do not include university students, graduates, or participants who did not specify education level. Discrepancy in total number who sat for the exam is reflective of the data provided.

Source: EDC (2013) Monitoring and evaluation data spreadsheet.

## F. Sector Economic Opportunities by Educational Attainment of AK Graduates and Age of AK Graduates

AK graduates working per sector	Educational attainment										Total
	P6 or less		S1-S3		S4-S6		In or Completed University		Unspecified		
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	
ICT	28	15	25	13	122	66	7	4	4	2	186
Construction General	274	47	158	27	114	20	3	1	34	6	583
Plumbing	2	33	2	33	2	33	0	0	0	0	6
Painting	48	67	19	26	3	4	0	0	2	3	72
Electricians	12	10	49	42	52	44	2	2	3	3	118
Masonry	116	51	54	24	34	15	0	0	23	10	227
Carpentry	14	45	8	26	8	26	1	3	0	0	31
Welding	62	67	20	22	6	6	0	0	5	5	93
Unspecified	20	56	6	17	9	25	0	0	1	3	36
Hospitality	77	13	186	32	271	47	27	5	13	2	574
Sewing and Hairdressing	83	49	52	31	13	8	0	0	22	13	170
Car Mechanics	25	17	41	28	76	51	0	0	6	4	148
Agribusiness	220	48	99	22	123	27	1	0	15	3	458
Commerce (selling and marketing)	31	26	24	20	59	50	1	1	3	3	118
<b>Total</b>	1,012	36	743	26	892	32	42	1	131	5	2,820

Note: Table contains data on AK graduates that found economic opportunities (paid internship, employment, or self-employment). Notice the distribution of graduates across a field.

Source: EDC (2013) Monitoring and evaluation data spreadsheet.

Sector Employment by Age	Under 20		20+		Total	
	#	%	#	%	#	%
ICT	76	41	110	59	186	7
Construction General	251	43	332	57	583	21
Plumbing	3	50	3	50	6	0
Painting	38	53	34	47	72	3
Electricians	38	32	80	68	118	4
Masonry	102	45	125	55	227	8
Carpentry	11	35	20	65	31	1
Welding	44	47	49	53	93	3
Unspecified	15	42	21	58	36	1
Hospitality	146	25	428	75	574	20
Sewing and Hairdressing	115	68	55	32	170	6
Car Mechanics	88	59	60	41	148	5
Agribusiness	179	39	279	61	458	16
Commerce (selling and marketing)	45	38	73	62	118	4
<b>Total</b>	<b>1151</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>1669</b>	<b>59</b>	<b>2820</b>	<b>100</b>

Note: Red text indicates the age group with the majority of placements in the sector and overall. Table contains data on AK graduates that found economic opportunities (paid internship, employment, or self-employment). Notice the distribution of graduates across a field.

Source: EDC (2013) Monitoring and evaluation data spreadsheet.

## ANNEX 7. RWANDA TVET QUALIFICATION FRAMEWORK

<b>LEVEL</b>	<b>DEGREE OR CERTIFICATE</b>	<b>CURRENT STATUS</b>
Level 1	Training for primary school graduates	Offered by AK IPs and other providers
Level 2	Catch-up program	None currently being offered
Level 3	Certificate 1	Offered by VTCs and TSSs
Level 4	Certificate 2	Offered by TSSs
Level 5	Certificate 3	Offered by TSSs
Level 6	A1	Offered by IPRCs or colleges of technology
Level 7	A2	Offered by IPRCs or colleges of technology

Source: Personal Communication, February 2013

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